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ABSTRACT
This work focuses on the influence of terror, extremism, trafficking and corruption on the
regional security of Central Asia, with a particular emphasis on Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is
regarded as the most stable and financially developed state in Central Asia, yet domestic and
regional stability are threatened by the rise in extremism, narcotics trafficking, institutional
corruption and acts of terrorism. The challenges of trafficking and extremism within the region
originated from outside of Central Asia. Foreign organizations and ideologies are significant
actors in progression of regional instability. Government response to these challenges can
perpetuate or stymie the aforementioned threats to regional security. Repressive regimes
inadvertently contribute to the propaganda of the non-state foes. A prominent solution is the
international program referred to as border management. This program aims to support border
security while also promoting economic growth and ensuring the protection of human rights.
Improved borders promotes regional security, economic growth can potentially undermine the
growth of corruption and human rights protection can undermine a large part of extremist
propaganda.
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Chapter I: Introduction to Central Asia’s Challenges
I. Thesis Statement
Central Asia is a burgeoning region with increasing economic, political and security
relevance. Kazakhstan is the prominent power within the region, with economic success and
internal stability being significant contributing factors. The stability of the domestic economy
and political framework are functions of the overall security structure of the state. In order to
maintain Kazakh security and in turn regional security, effective border management is
necessary. Global contribution to border management protects international interests and
provides a boost to regional powers. In order to clarify the framework of this research, I will
make note of the independent and dependent variables.
A. Variables
This thesis places an emphasis on Kazakhstan, but the various states of Central Asia are
examined due to interconnected nature of regional challenges. Central Asian security is the
dependent variable of this research. Examination of Central Asia in large provides a greater view
of the origins of regional challenges and in turn imparts potential solutions. A multitude of issues
impact the dependent variable. I will analyze the most pertinent challenges within the context of
Central Asian security and conclude with a prescription of border management strategies that
undermine the impact of these threats. The independent variables for this thesis are terrorism and
extremism, illegal trafficking and other border concerns that undermine security including
corruption and ethnic tensions. To substantiate my argument, I will demonstrate the relevance
between the independent and dependent variables as well as underlining the relevance of these
issues to regional and global powers.
1

B. Relevance
The relation between the independent variables and the dependent variable is sound. The
impact of terrorism on regional security is clear. The operations of terrorist organizations,
especially effective attacks are key contributors to instability. Illegal trafficking poses a threat to
both global and regional security. Ban Ki-Moon, the Secretary-General of the United Nations
affirms this assertion and pronounces trafficking is evolving into a more ominous threat that
requires cooperation between governments.1 With the prominence of Afghanistan in drug
trafficking and its proximity to Central Asia, it is by no means a daring feat to assert trafficking’s
negative impact on regional security. Issues such as ethnic turmoil and corruption are also
strongly linked to security and potentially undermine integral border solutions. This impact will
be discussed in a later chapter.
II. Topic Significance
Naturally, the significance of Central Asian security must be explained. Not all regions
are equally significant in the grand scheme of world affairs. One may not typically identify this
particular region as noteworthy when it comes to global security concerns. In reality, Central
Asia plays an increasingly crucial role in global security. Kazakhstan and several other regional
states have established multi-faceted relationships with global and regional powers. Many of
these linkages are centered on security and economics. The issues of regional security and border
management have great political significance. Before I delve deeper into the security challenges
of Kazakhstan and Central Asia, the political significance of regional security must be clarified.
A. Policy Significance
Central Asian border management is not simply a regional issue. The maintenance and
concerted effort to enhance Central Asia security is an endeavor with political implications for
2

several international powers. Kazakhstan, as the leading power within the region requires
stability within neighboring Central Asian states. Regional instability undermines Kazakh
security and threatens the economic and political sectors as well. From a policy standpoint,
Kazakhstan and regional players often work collectively to increase security. Many efforts to
combat security challenges are taken through bilateral relations or within the structure of
regional organizations. Cooperation is vital in the preventing trafficking and terrorism. The issue
of regional security is not solely the concern of Central Asian states, other powers with interests
and relationships in Central Asia are also affected. The United States is one of the several powers
affected by and contributing to Central Asian policy.
1. Significance to the U.S.: Within the context of the United States’ foreign policy,
Central Asia is tremendously significant. In my analysis, American interests in the region
revolve around three central issues. Terrorism and extremism within Central Asia are concerns to
American interests due to the region’s proximity to Afghanistan. The U.S. would
correspondingly want to stop the spread of terror organizations as Central Asia is rapidly
becoming the next ideological battleground. The region is integral to the global ‘war on terror’
which is a prominent facet of U.S. foreign policy. Trafficking is another regional issue with
policy implications for the United States. The link between illegal trafficking and the funding of
terrorism makes trafficking a factor within the fight against global terror. Kazakh resources are
also of interest to the U.S. and its allies. The U.S. seeks to address its resource concerns amongst
competition from Russia and China.
2. Central Asia and China: China’s concerns in Central Asia are similar to those of the
United States. Terrorism and extremism are common concerns, but China’s situation also focuses
3

on domestic separatism. Well documented treatment of Uighurs by the Chinese government
underlines China’s concerns involving their Uighur population and Islam. Mismanagement of
border threats within Central Asia would threaten the tenuous situation in China’s Xinjiang
region; the spread of extremist and terrorist rhetoric is of particular concern. The current growth
of China points to interest in Kazakhstan’s gas and oil. The acquisition of Kazakh resources will
help fulfill Chinese needs as production and domestic development continue to expand. As China
looks to promote stability in Kazakhstan to reinforce their own economic and security issues,
Russia also supports Kazakh order with similar intentions in mind.
3. The Russian perspective: Russia is another power with political concerns in Central
Asia. Russia’s security situation changed significantly following the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. With the Central Asian states no longer under Soviet rule, Russia must contribute to
regional security in order to create a buffer from threats emanating from Afghanistan and within
Central Asia itself. The growth of radicalism in the region is an issue pertinent to Russia’s
security due to the potential cross-border threat from Central Asia. Geographically, Russia is
along several trafficking routes leaving it vulnerable to all of the effects of illicit trade. Russia,
like the U.S. and China exhibits interest in Central Asian resources. Although Russia is resource
rich, influence over regional resources is the motivation for Russia’s interest in Kazakhstan’s oil
and gas. Additional challenges aside from terror, extremism and trafficking are important to
overcome in the pursuit of effective border management and must be discussed in order to get a
more complete look at regional challenges and the manner in which they may be possibly
remedied.
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The other factors contributing to the political significance of Central Asian border
management, include ethnic violence, demarcation and organizational efficiency and corruption.
Despite terrorism, trafficking being the most prominently featured challenges to border and
regional security, the previously mentioned issues are also imperative. The implications of
regional issues affect neighboring states as well as far-removed countries such as the United
States. Central Asian border management is a pertinent issue and its ties to the war on terror and
the global need for energy resources make it an international challenge.
III. Literature Review
Although Central Asia is historically not as thoroughly examined as regions like the
Middle East, Europe and Latin America, I was able to find a plethora of information on regional
challenges. This thesis examines the regional challenges and border threats from 1990 to the
current day. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and subsequent establishment of five new
Central Asian states is the pivotal point in regional affairs, but the preceding events within the
context of the Soviet Union elucidate the problems the new states are currently facing. First we
will survey what literary sources say about terror and extremism.
A. Literature Review of Terrorism and Extremism
Although the global focus shifted to the Middle East following the events of September
11th, Central Asia also garnered international attention in the context of the global war on terror.
It is important to understand that Central Asia has a legacy of extremism and terrorism that
preceded the attack on American soil in 2001. I will refer to the growth of terror and extremism
within Central Asia starting with the fall of the Soviet Union and ending with the current state of
terror threats within the region.

5

1. Soviet Origins: The Soviet authority anticipated the resurgence of Islam within its
Central Asian possessions during the final days of the Soviet Union. When the predominantly
Muslim states gained their independence there was a revival of Islam within the region. This
resurgence concerned Central Asia governments, particularly Kazakhstan. The previously
mentioned concerns did not compel an effective hindrance of extremism. Government officials
cited demographics and geographical factors as reasons for radical Islam not being able to thrive
in the region.2 Various sources mentioned this perception of geography preventing any
significant rise in extremist ideology. Unfortunately, this assertion did not ring true and radical
ideology did grow in Kazakhstan and neighboring states.
2. Kazakh and regional challenges: Kazakhstan sought to combat the new reality of
growing radical Islam. Kazakhstan’s attempt to hinder the growth of radical Islam came in a state
imposed version of Islam. The state attempted the give the Kazakh Muslims a voice within the
government while not committing to adopting the religion nationally. While the state maintained
secularity, an administration was established to guide religious adherents within the country. The
effectiveness of this administration left much to be desired and opposition formed with the
introduction of Kazakhstan National Independence Party Alash. The introduction of this party
clashed with the government’s goal of controlling religious discourse. The party’s aspiration of
establishing a unified Islamic state also contradicted the state commitment to secularity.3
Eventually, the opposition group fell victim to internal radicalism and was subsequently
disbanded in late 1991. With that said, the reaction in the early 90s did not reflect the growing
threat of radicals seeking to destabilize the region. In 1991, Islamists were able to succeed in
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destabilization efforts in Uzbekistan; the city of Namangan was taken over by Islamists for a
brief period.4
According to the literature, foreign sources of Islam infiltrated Kazakhstan in the early
1990s. Various sources throughout the Muslim world financially supported the establishment of
religious institutions. Much of the funding for Islamic education in Kazakhstan originated in
Arab countries.5 This foreign influence would contribute to other forms of terror and extremism
within Central Asia. With foreign influence in mosques and religious schools throughout
Kazakhstan, the government sought to officially establish a constitutional mandate making
Kazakhstan a secular republic in 1995. The constitution also placed restrictions on religious
political parties and foreign religious organizations. At this point, the Kazakh government sought
to undermine the influence of the non-government religious sector and foreign incarnations of
Islam. Karagiannis’ examination of political Islam in Kazakhstan and Edelbay’s analysis of
Islam within the country both cited the foreign influence in Kazakhstan. The influence of
militant ideologues from Afghanistan is intensified in the southern states of Central Asia. Before
I continue with the growth of extremism and terror I will speak on the foreign aspect of Islam.
3. Central Asia’s Islam vs. Foreign Islam: There are variations between the Islam
prominent in Central Asia and that of the Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan and other Muslim
states. There are further variations within Central Asia. Despite Kazakhstan affirming its status
as a secular republic, the state did promote a variant of Islam that would serve the state needs
while taking into account the massive Muslim population within the country. The Kazakh
government supported the Hanafi School of orthodox Sunni Islam. The Hanafi School was
portrayed as a positive variant of Islam while the Islam dominant in destabilized Tajikistan and
7

Afghanistan was portrayed negatively.6 The Hanafi school of Sunni Islam is moderate and
tolerant of opposing views which is more compatible with the government’s aspirations for
religion in the state. Sufism is another moderate school that is widely practiced amongst the
population of southern Kazakhstan. Even with a dominant moderate population of Islamic
adherents, Central Asia governments became weary of any signs of extremist or puritanical
Islam. Women dressed in hijab or entirely covered as well as men with full beards were viewed
with suspicion and occasionally arrested.7
This suspicion can be linked to the growth of purist Islamic groups. Largely known as
Wahhabis, the purists groups are radicals, reformers and revivalists that threaten the Central
Asian governments and challenge the more moderate majority of society. The term Wahhabis is
less of a description and more of a general term used to broadly categorize extremist groups. The
presence of radical Salafits, largely in the western region of Kazakhstan, point to the necessity of
effective border management. This ideology entered through missionaries from Arab states that
came to the country to work on oil projects. The radical element infiltrated Kazakh religious
schools and many young Kazakhs visited Saudi Arabia to study in schools that propagated
radical ideology.8
The role of foreign influences in the growth and spread of extremism within Central Asia
must not be understated. Many Arab states contributed to the establishment of the religious
infrastructure in Central Asia which brought with it the propagation of purist or Wahhabi Islam.
This clashes with the moderate school of Islam which is adopted by the majority of Kazakhs and
Central Asians. State positions of secularity are threatened as many of these groups aim to
establish a caliphate through either peaceful or violent means. According to Ihsan Yilmaz,
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Islamist groups have been less successful in their recruitment efforts in Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan whose populations have been historically nomadic and less religious than their
regional counterparts.9 This coupled with the embrace of moderate Islam by the majority of the
regional population makes Kazakhstan more guarded from popular embrace of the radical
ideologies of various extremist groups. With that said, the government will have to measure their
approach with extremist ideologues. Next, we will look at the progression of extremism and
terror and how it clashed with the corrupt communist government of Tajikistan.
4. Progression of extremism and terror: As we continue to look at the growth of terror
and extremism in Central Asia it is important to notice the role of foreign influence. A
substantial amount of influence in the early 1990s was financial and ideological as I stated
previously. The outbreak of civil war in Tajikistan exhibited the more destructive role of
extremist and anti-government action. With the Soviet Union coming to an end, various groups
within Tajikistan called for free elections. These calls were initially disregarded when the
Communist Party of Tajikistan placed former communist leader Rahman Nabiyev in power. As
opposition grew, the Tajik government eventually capitulated to the demands of Islamic and
democratic groups seeking elections, but the results only further intensified tensions as Nabiyev
won the election with over 50 percent of the vote.10 This incited violence in March 1992, which
saw the communist forces facing opposition forces including democratic and Islamic groups.
Forces loyal to Nabiyev were able to push back the democratic and Islamic forces despite their
gains. Many within the opposition fled to Afghanistan including members of the Tajikistan’s
Islamic Renaissance Party. Still in its infancy, the Commonwealth of Independent States sent a
peacekeeping force to Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan to counter the movements of Islamic
9

guerillas operating from across the border.11 Here we see the unification of radical Islamist
groups in effort to overthrow the secular state and a coordinated response by regional
governments. Afghanistan provided safe haven for radical elements fighting the Tajik state. The
utilization of Afghanistan as a harbor for militants and extremists is continually shown in the
literature. The state ineffectiveness of Afghanistan has given solace to militants from Pakistan,
Iran, Central Asia and even militant separatists from China’s Xinjiang province. An important
facet of this relationship is that the Central Asian governments opposed the Taliban in favor of
the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.12 This reality only made cross-border destabilization more
beneficial to the militants in Afghanistan. Tajikistan’s civil war came to an end following a peace
agreement in June 1997, granting the opposition forces a governmental quota and provided the
Islamic Renaissance Party with legal recognition.13 Another operation of militant Islam occurred
in 1999 in neighboring Uzbekistan, this case also exhibited the threat militants pose to regional
governments especially considering the target of the attacks.
5. Terror’s growth: Two years following the Tajik peace agreement marked one the most
significant terror attacks within Central Asia to that point. The Tashkent bombings of 1999
rocked Uzbekistan and put the neighboring states on high alert. The IMU were accused of
coordinating the attack which was seen as an assassination attempt on Uzbek President
Karimov.14 Three years earlier a Chechen warlord established a training camp for Uzbek
militants. A former IMU chief admitted to receiving training in Chechnya.15 The foreign
influence of extremism is present once again and the need for effective border measures is
emphasized. In 2000, Central Asia encountered a reprieve of sorts when the IMU was driven out
of the region and into Afghanistan. This would seem like a positive at first glance, but movement
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into a less stabilized state allowed the IMU and other militant groups to gain in strength. This
assertion will be elucidated further in later chapters. The following year marked a more global
emphasis on Central Asia amongst other regions with the attacks of September 11th. American
influence in the region grew and Central Asia became a key player in the global war on terror.
Even with increased military presence, the states of Central Asia still remained under the threat
of terrorism. The southern states continued to be targeted more commonly. Uzbekistan suffered
further attacks in March 2004 when police forces were attacked in Tashkent. A few months later
the Israeli and American embassies were bombed with Tashkent once again being the target.16 It
is not surprising that the southern states of Central Asia were being plagued by extremist rhetoric
and terrorism. Proximity to Afghanistan is a large reason for this, but other contributing factors
are explained in the next chapter.
Kazakhstan has generally been the most stable state in Central Asia. The state remained
largely protected from terror attacks. This dramatically changed in 2011 with the two terrorist
attempts that have been linked to the Soldiers of the Caliphate organization. One attempt was
successful and caused the death of police, civilians and the militant, while the other solely
resulted in the death of the Soldier of the Caliphate operative.17 The rise of this group and its
origins will be detailed in the terrorism and extremism chapter, but it is significant to link this
group with the rise of terror in Kazakhstan. Extremist rhetoric throughout Central Asia has been
propagated by Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami. This organization poses a threat in an ideological sense
although many in the region are convinced the group is involved in violence and terror. At this
juncture the IMU had been pushed out of Central Asia after coordinating attacks in Uzbekistan
and Kyrgyzstan and aiding the opposition in Tajikistan. This organization maintains influence
11

throughout the Central Asian states and there are reports of a reemergence of the IMU.18 This
group played a large role in actual attacks and militancy in the region and the reported return of
the group will be worth monitoring. The presence of these three groups and a few others is
undeniable when examining the history of terror and extremism in Central Asia. The interaction
of these radical elements will certainly effect the future of terrorism and extremism in the region.
B. Literature Review of Trafficking
Trafficking is another independent variable with a recognizable impact on regional
security. States have sought to implement measures that would fortify their borders against this
threat, but other factors have hindered the effectiveness of said measures. Much of the literature
on trafficking makes mention of terrorism and this comes as no surprise as the two are closely
linked. I will outline the progression of trafficking following the dissolution of the Soviet Union
and then delve deeper into the topic.
1. After the Fall: The fall of the Soviet Union brought with it a host of issues for the new
states. During the Soviet Union’s administration, Central Asian crops that were used in narcotics
were shoddily eradicated. Many thought the eradication efforts were simply a façade and the
government was actually gaining from the narcotics trade. Other theories reinforce this belief.
Whether true or not, the crops were in large part gone when the Central Asian states became
independent, they could not participate in the production of narcotics on a large scale as had
allegedly been the case during Soviet rule.19 Although Central Asia did not have the resources to
be a narcotics producer, it is a strategic transit point in the drug trade due to its geographic
location between Russia and Afghanistan. Before I continue, I would like to note the importance
of narcotics trafficking in Central Asia. This is the most dominant form of trafficking regionally
12

and worldwide and generates billions of dollars annually. My research reflected this assertion
with the majority of sources related to trafficking focusing on narcotics. That is not to say that
arms trafficking is not a threat to border and internal security, but narcotics will be discussed
with more depth than the threat of loose weapons. I previously mentioned the conflict in
Tajikistan, now I will briefly explain the role trafficking played in this engagement and how
trafficking can contribute to further conflict.
2. Brief history of trafficking and violence: As the Central Asian states sought to set
themselves up for success following independence, Tajikistan was thrust into a bloody civil war
in 1992. I mentioned the role of extremist and militant groups in the opposition’s fight against
the communist government, but the impact of trafficking must be acknowledged as well. Drug
sales fueled arms sales during the war. Warlords from both sides of the conflict gained from
trafficking revenues and used the funds to grow their weapons arsenal. The destabilization effect
of trafficking is at play here as the conflict appears to have been prolonged by granting the
belligerents more ammunition in which to fight with.20 Some sources I examined claimed the
relation between trafficking and terror to be negligible, but the next few examples run contrary to
this belief. The first situation involves the IMU. While we are aware of the IMU’s ouster from
Tajikistan and Central Asia in large, it must be emphasized that the group has not perished. Will
and resilience may be small factors that kept the group dedicated to its cause, but the safe haven
of Afghanistan allowed for the IMU to stay relevant through the narcotics trade. With Taliban
acquiescence, the IMU funded itself through narcotics trafficking while exiled from Central
Asia.21 A disconnect exists between the various works analyzing Central Asia and trafficking.
Some perspectives claim that terrorism and trafficking are not as closely linked as perceived
13

while many voices in security and defense institutions say the two issues are directly related. My
argument is closer in agreement with the latter perspective, although I understand that other
factors must be taken into account as to why terrorism and extremism is rising, yet trafficking is
a significant financial resource and has been implemented in the past with the potential to cause
further harm to Central Asia.
Although terrorism is influenced by various factors, funding through trafficking cannot
be scoffed at as negligible. The relationship between the two threats is potent, and if not granted
the opportunity to fund themselves the IMU may have dissolved or not had the opportunity to
reemerge in Central Asia. The next situation further emphasizes the previous point. Recall the
terror attacks of 2004 in Uzbekistan that I briefly mentioned previously. Two possible
contributors of this attack were foreign extremism and narcotics trafficking. Hezb-i-Islami, a
militant group from Afghanistan is reported to use profits from opium trafficking to finance
attacks in Uzbekistan.22 With various reports indicating different groups as the coordinators of
this attack, I will not specifically link this attack to trafficking, but use it simply as an indication
of the potential of the interaction between narcotics trafficking and terror. It is also important to
understand that terrorist groups are not the only players in regional trafficking, in some cases the
governments also profit from the illegal transfer of narcotics.
3. State and Trafficking: Various sources have shown that states are often times complicit
or actively engaging in the trafficking. Nancy Lubin’s assessment of trafficking and corruption
and David Lewis’ “High Times on the Silk Road: The Central Asian Paradox” both point to
Turkmenistan as a prime example of government involvement in the illicit trade. State
involvement is present throughout the entire region according to the sources I gathered, with
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varying levels of participation. In the mid-1990s Saparmurad Niyazov’s Turkmenistan resembled
a dictatorship. According to reports, Niyazov took control of a large portion of the drug trade in
the country. A former chairman of the Central Bank who previously fled the country claimed
Niyazov had millions in Afghan heroin in his personal vault, while others claimed that the leader
had stockpiles of drugs within the presidential palace.23 Attacks on border agents for discovering
and reporting narcotics shipments have also been reported. This level of collusion with the drug
trade does not seem apparent in Kazakhstan, but state sponsored trafficking undermines regional
efforts to combat trafficking. State involvement in trafficking may be more favorable in terms of
the goals of the war on terror as militants are less likely to be funded. This does not dismiss the
negative impacts of trafficking such as crime, addiction and HIV and other factors that
undermine state stability. State involvement in illicit activity is a facet of my final section which
examines various border issues.
C. Border Challenges
Regional stability is affected by challenges aside from trafficking, terrorism and
extremism. Corruption, ethnic conflict, demarcation efforts as well as the pursuit of oil and gas
resources are issues tied to regional stability. These concepts will be briefly described in the
following paragraphs.
1. Corruption: My assessment of corruption analyzes the ties with trafficking, with a
particular focus on narcotics trafficking. This is largely tied to the massive revenues from the
trade. From the sources I collected, corruption tied to trafficking existed prior to Soviet
dissolution and the Central Asian states simply continued the process. The progression of
corruption has been harder to combat as time has went on due to the growth in narcotics
15

revenues. The price of drugs has decreased, but the output and demand has increased leading to
dramatic global profit in the billions. In 2000, the estimated profit was approximately $100
billion.24 The financial incentive perpetuates the cycle of corruption as officials entrench
themselves in their positions through bribery. Ultimately, corruption is seen as a significant
obstacle in the battle against trafficking; with narcotics earnings increasing it will become more
difficult to control.
2. Demarcation: Demarcation processes began during the downfall of the Soviet Union
and continue on to this day as borders are in the final stages of the process. Kazakhstan’s
demarcation process has largely been positive. Demarcation of the Kazakh-Chinese border
proved positive for the relations of the two countries, in fact the process is cited as being a large
factor in increased coordination between the governments.25 The process of demarcating territory
with the majority of the Central Asian states went without major issues for Kazakhstan. The one
exception was Uzbekistan. This process turned violent when Uzbekistan encroached upon
Kazakh territory, leading to multiple attacks on Kazakhs which proved fatal in some instances.26
Protests based on ethnic issues also developed over demarcation of this border.27 Although there
have been instances of violence related to border boundaries, the process of demarcation has
been positive and fostered closer relations between Kazakhstan and key figures in the region.
Kazakhstan’s southern neighbors have been more vulnerable to ethnic tensions within the
Fergana Valley and along their shared borders.
3. Ethnic Tension: Most of the ethnic conflict within Central Asia appears to occur in the
Fergana region where Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan meet. Under Soviet rule, Uzbeks
and Meskhetian Turks clashed in 1989. The following year in Osh, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks were
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engaged in a brutal conflict with each other that resulted in hundreds of deaths.28 After these
events there was a period where tensions remained, but did not result in mass violence. This
changed in 2010. The concentration of power by Kyrgyzstan’s Kurmanbek Bakiyev infuriated
Kyrgyz clans in the north. Seeking to encourage support in the south, Bakiyev stoked ethnic
fervor as Uzbeks came out in force against the leader, this group clashed with the pro-Bakiyev
Kyrgyz. Tensions ultimately led to clashes that left approximately 2000 dead with many other
displaced. The most recent clashes have had a destabilizing effect on Kyrgyzstan and in the
opinion of Vicken Cheterian makes the country look increasingly more like a failed state.29 The
conflict in Fergana is pertinent to regional stability and although ethnic issues have arisen with
other populations within Central Asia, this scenario poses the greater threat to regional stability.
In my analysis of the literature about Central Asia and Kazakhstan, I have found that
many of the persistent problems have existed under Soviet rule. As the former Soviet possessions
transitioned into sovereign states these challenges were dealt with in various ways. The legacies
of extremism, trafficking and ethnic tension remained. Efforts to alleviate these issues have been
hindered by institutional inefficiency and corruption. Addressing these problems will make
border management initiative more effective.
IV. How does this topic fit in the literature?
I believe this work contributes to the overall limited literature on Central Asia. This
region is not as explored as many other regions of the world. With the states of the region
becoming independent in the early 1990s, this area is relatively new. This work is an attempt to
create a concise analysis of regional threats that can possibly be alleviated with effective border
management. This places an emphasis on Kazakhstan as well as regional organizations that
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contribute to can contribute to stability. This work also attempts to examine Central Asia and
Kazakhstan in a different sense than many other security analyses. Quite a bit of the source
material simply refers to the region as a strategic point in the war on terror and trafficking. While
these topics will be mentioned heavily, this work emphasizes regional security first as opposed to
the direct interests of other powers. With that said, the prescription of effective border
management should have a stabilizing influence on the region which is beneficial to American,
Russian, Chinese and global interests.
V. Research Design
The research design of this work involves the analysis of various cases within Central
Asia. Through this analysis I will provide of the historical and present challenges of the region
and proceed to apply them within the context of regional border threats. The proposed solutions
of these threats will reside in the methods of border management. This term under OSCE
standards means states affirm their commitment in regional and sub-regional levels where
cooperation among relevant organizations and agencies and promotion of consistent standards.
This includes bilateral and regional agreements that enhance border security while fostering
economic and social stability.30 The OSCE also promotes the protection of human rights within
their border management programme for Central Asia.31 The United Nations Development
Programme also contributes to border management efforts within the region.32 The topic of
border management throughout this research will involve the efforts to implement institutional
reforms and the protection of human rights.
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I. Sections within Study
The content of this study is divided into three categories. The final chapter analyzes the
content of the previous three through a multi-level analysis with global, regional, state and
individual perspectives accounted for. Terrorism and Extremism within Central Asia is the first
challenge analyzed, the subsequent chapters are dedicated to trafficking and border challenges.
1. Terrorism and Extremism: The chapter on terrorism and extremism focuses on the
current threat to Central Asia while also examining past events. Contributors to terror are also
analyzed and assessed as border threats. This includes foreign funding and influence of Central
Asian Islam. Extremist and terror organizations will be examined and their origins will also be
detailed to emphasize the cross-border threat and importance of effective border management
through state and regional efforts. The recent attacks in the historically stable Kazakhstan
underline this assertion.
2. Trafficking: This analysis of trafficking focuses on the linkage between terror and
regional destabilization. I cite examples of trafficking funding extremism and terror, but also
briefly look at the corruptive effect it has on regional institutions that are necessary to the pursuit
of border security. The influence of corruption will be explained further in this chapter. The
entry point of Tajikistan and production hub of Afghanistan are discussed as well as the global
depth of the narcotics trade. The domestic consequences are also explained in order to clarify the
threat to the state on an individual level with a special focus on Kazakhstan.
3. Border Challenges: The chapter on border challenges mentions several other issues
concerning the maintenance of border and regional security. This includes the role of
demarcation efforts and how it has largely impacted the region positively by enhancing border
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cooperation. Ethnic tensions are discussed with the Fergana valley being the primary area of
analysis. The impetus for these clashes and subsequent influence on domestic and thus regional
destabilization is discussed. Illegal migration as it pertains to the economic disparity within the
region is mentioned and this situation points to the importance in security stabilization on
economic stabilization. Oil and gas resources are examined to underline the international interest
in the region and importance of effective border management to sustaining regional security and
economic interests of global powers.
4. Multi-level analysis: The final chapter examines the three previous chapters with a
focus on the global, regional, state and individual levels of analysis. The individual level looks at
the impact of leaders, but also accounts for the influence on civilians within the region.
I seek to effectively promote the idea of border management as a resolution to the various
challenges undermining Central Asian and thus Kazakhstan’s security. Bilateral and regional
commitment to securing borders and promoting military cooperation is a step in the right
direction, but issues such as corruption are weakening these efforts. This means that regional and
global initiatives to security must be accompanied by ardent commitments to stemming the
growth of corruption.
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Chapter II: Kazakhstan under the threat of Extremism and Terror
I. Introduction
Despite being comparatively more stable than its southern neighbors, Kazakhstan is still
aware of the destabilizing forces that occupy the southern flank. Islamic extremism is a
concerning ideology within Central Asia and threatens the security of Kazakhstan through the
growth of extremist groups in neighboring countries such as, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The
dissemination and escalation in intensity of extremist ideology results in higher probability of
terrorist activity. The impact of such activity is multifaceted. For example, the execution of
terrorism within Kazakh borders can result in casualties and/or increased support for the
extremism if the actions can be propagated into just retaliation against an oppressive
government. The Kazakh government will have to respond by means of increased security
measures, suppression of extremist activity and fortification of its border to hinder the movement
of international terrorists. An assessment of border security provides a glimpse into the
significance of the rest of Central Asia in terms of maintaining Kazakhstan’s security and
stability.
A. Effects of Terror on Stability
It is important to recognize the devastating effect terrorism can have on both human lives
and the security of a state. Kazakhstan is much more fortunate than its neighbors to the south in
terms of preventing terror attacks. Kazakhstan’s security is not undermined to the extent that
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan’s have been, but the presence of militants in the country will always
pose a threat. The spillover effect from the southern border must also be accounted for.
Destabilization of neighbors and other regional powers directly impact the security of
Kazakhstan.
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1. Central Asia: Destabilization of the security structure in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan as well as other regional players impacts the stability interests of Kazakhstan. The
spread of extremist activity within the aforementioned neighboring countries undermines the
stability in each respective country; this instability provides for the growth of such movements.
When the security apparatus of Central Asia is undermined it is easier for militants to cross
borders, transport people and materials as well as carry out militant operations. The governments
of these countries do not simply let their territory become a safe haven for terrorists, and
American influence in the region can take a degree of credit for this with the security
relationships they have established with multiple Central Asian states, especially Kazakhstan.
2. Kazakhstan: Terror’s impact on Kazakhstan’s security has not been as drastic as it has
been in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Despite not having a legacy of terrorist attacks,
Kazakhstan does battle with the issue. There have been recent attempts in Kazakhstan, many of
which have been thwarted. It is important to look at the situations in less stable Central Asian
states when considering the potential impact terror could make in Kazakhstan. Tightening of
security and crackdowns on specific segments of society are consequences of the current
situation, but if militant and extremist operations continue to grow there is likely to be a more
intensified response. In order to prevent the emergence of extremist rhetoric, one must first
understand the conditions and locations that aid in the dissemination of such propaganda.
B. Where Extremist Rhetoric Thrives
Locating the source of extremist rhetoric in the region is important in combatting
propaganda and recruitment. Understanding the makeup of the southern border is particularly
vital considering the wider acceptance for extremism ideology.
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1. Fergana and the Southern border: Kazakhstan and its neighbors may be cracking down
on alleged extremist and terror groups, but there are regions in which extremist ideology is more
tolerated, an area such as the Fergana Valley comes to mind. This region will be discussed in
more detail later. Kazakhstan’s southern border that it shares with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan is
another region in which extremism is of great concern. Movement of radical elements between
these borders is a pivotal element in the spread of Islamic extremism within Central Asia. It is
unsurprising that extremist rhetoric is more widely accepted in the south when considering the
proximity to states which have had surges of terrorist activity. The existence of turbulent areas
that perpetuate the dissemination of extremist ideology within Central Asia is of the upmost
importance to Kazakhstan as well as global partners such as Russia, China and the United States.
These four countries are interested in maintaining regional stability in order to stop the further
spread of extremism in the region and prevent the growth and activity of extremist groups within
Kazakhstan as well as stopping their cross-border movement. Thus, it is vital to understand the
origin of religious extremism in Kazakhstan and how the state can combat these ideologies
conceived in different countries and exported into Kazakh territory.
II. Growth of Radicalism in Kazakhstan
The growth of radicalism in Kazakhstan can be attributed to foreign sources, as well as
government response to Islam. These influences endure today, but the origins of today’s
extremism was nurtured during the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
A. Soviet and Post-Soviet Response
The dissolution of the Soviet Union brought about a radical change. Countries with
substantial Muslim populations were now sovereign nations. The new states had to deal with
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state-building while also accounting for the role Islam would play. The integration of Islam into
the state would prove a complex task for Kazakhstan and would be undermined by a more
radical segment of Islam.
1. Early 1990s: Kazakhstan’s crackdown on radical Islamism in Central Asia has not
always been as ardent as it is currently. Presently, Kazakhstan is seen as the leading player in the
war on terror in the region, but this was not always the case. The U.S.S.R. foresaw the
reintegration of Islam into Central Asian society during the final stage of its existence. One of
the contributing factors to state acceptance of an Islamic revival was the fear of imported Islam.1
The transition to independence saw the continued growth of Islamic symbols and references in
the new Central Asian states. During the early 1990s, the Kazakh government failed to recognize
the radicalization of Islam within its borders. Radicalization was downplayed because the
authorities deemed the territory too large, the population too ethnically diverse and the economy
too promising.2 The entrance of Kazakhstan into the international community, following the fall
of the U.S.S.R and the establishment of ties with the west, lulled officials in Kazakhstan into a
false sense of security. Yet, extremism did begin to rear its head and the Kazakh government
sought to quell the growth through a system of cooptation.
2. Attempted Cooptation: The attempted nationalization of Islam assumed the hindrance
of Muslim opposition groups and that moderate Islam would dominate its radical counterpart.
Nationalization, in this case, does not refer to an attempt to make Islam the national religion, but
instead denotes an attempt to placate the Muslim population by installing a state sanctioned
version of Islam. Nursultan Nazarbayev sought to do this by incorporating Muslim authorities
into the state structure. Nazarbayev established a religious authority for Kazakh Muslims known
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as the Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Kazakhstan (SAMK).3 Institutionalized Islam
remains prevalent in Kazakhstan and those in leadership positions are involved in the battle
against radicalism. A main challenge remains limiting the impact of foreign Islam, this will be
dealt with in more depth in a later section, but first I will shed light on the resistance state
sanctioned Islam faced.
B. Opposition to State Islam
State sponsored Islam failed in stemming the rise of opposing Islamic parties. Initially,
the threat was minimal, except providing the populace with a more grassroots alternative to state
sanctioned Islam. This situation would change following the influence of extremist voices within
the initially moderate opposition.
1. Moderate Party undermined by extremist element: Against the interests of Nazarbayev,
a new opposition party was formed anyway. The Kazakhstan National Independence Party Alash
(KNIPA) was established in spring 1990 and promoted a doctrine of moderate Islam as well as
nationalism. The goals of the party are described as
the achievement by Kazakhstan of the real status of an independent ethnic state, the
integration and propagation of the ideas of Turkic unity and Moslem solidarity, and the
national rebirth of Kazakhstan as the historical nucleus of the future unified Islamic
Turkic state, Great Turkestan.4
The function of KNIPA as a moderate voice for Islam in Kazakhstan would suffer immensely at
the end of 1991 when a more radical segment of the party sought to undermine Nazarbayev’s
cooptation of Islam. Radicals attempted to forcibly remove the mufti of Kazakhstan. The
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attempted ouster stems from allegations of the mufti working with Kazakh and Russian security
forces and other irregularities. This attempt resulted in the exile of KNIPA leaders, but also
marked the growth of Islam particularly of foreign nature within Kazakhstan.5 Kazakhstan’s
efforts to encourage a state approved version of Islam within the country was undermined by an
influx of foreign interest and investment in Kazakhstan’s religious infrastructure. KNIPA
provides an example of the multiple facets of political opposition.
C. Loyal opposition and Disloyal opposition
When addressing the state of opposition within Kazakhstan, it is important to
differentiate the nature of opposition. Loyal opposition is described as the opposition that may
disagree with the governing parties, but are loyal to the government as the source of power
within the state. Disloyal opposition, on the other hand, does not desire to work within the state
framework. Disloyal opposition, in this sense, operates outside of the government and includes
extremist groups and terror organizations. It is important to address the instances when the
government manipulates this classification to suit their needs. These types of groups will be
analyzed in a section focusing on the notable players in Islamism within Central Asia. I will
address the disloyal groups within this section as groups that have been banished from the
political landscape, but first I will briefly outline the state of loyal opposition in Kazakhstan.
1. Loyal Opposition: As stated previously, loyal opposition is formed by the groups that
work within the political framework. Even if they vehemently oppose the policy of the state, the
state is still acknowledged as the appropriate governing body. I will briefly analyze the Adilet
and Ak Zhol parties, as well as two communist parties within Kazakhstan.
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The Adilet party is an example of loyal opposition. The group whose name translates to
Justice, fights against government corruption. With an active fight for justice and willingness to
oppose the governance of Nazarbayev, the Adilet party poses a political threat to the current
regime, but not a threat to the political situation itself.6
Another political group within Kazakhstan is the Ak Zhol party known as the Bright Way
party. This is another democratic group that considers itself a constructive opposition.7 The
group promotes democracy, independence and freedom. One of the recent efforts of the group
was their attempt to outlaw government officials from having bank accounts and properties
abroad to stem corruption.8 Ak Zhol’s position as a loyal opposition is undermined by the reality
of media in Kazakhstan, where many of the country’s citizens get their television from Russia,
which portrays political change from opposition groups as negative.9 This is a significant point
because with the portrayal of opposition groups seeking political change as negative, the power
of the ruling party Nur Otan is further entrenched. Although being an opposition force, Ak Zhol
has worked with Nazarbayev’s Nur Otan to further their influence within Kazakh politics.10
The communist front of opposition is characterized by two groups. The first being the
Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPK) and the other being the Communist People’s party
(CPPK). The CPK evolved from the Soviet-era communist party of Kazakhstan and registered as
a Kazakh party in 1994. From this point, the party was engaged in various opposition
coalitions.11 This involvement would eventually hinder the group’s influence in Kazakh politics
when they were suspended from their operations for forming the Popular Front alliance with an
unregistered group known as Alga.12 This suspension of six months occurred in October 2011,
and was followed with an increase in the suspension length for a further six months.13 The CPPK
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is the other prominent communist group in Kazakhstan and promotes the ideologies of Marxism
and Leninism. This group is also emphatically anti-western, but from my research it appears to
be ideological rather than actually posing a physical threat to the west, or western influence in
Kazakhstan. The CPPK maintains connections with communist groups throughout the region,
but since the group does not maintain wide popular support it does not pose a great threat to
categorize it as disloyal opposition. If the CPPK had widespread support and actively sought to
overthrow the current regime in favor of a Marxist state, then the case would be different. These
groups only pose a minimal threat in the realm of politics, so they are essentially considered
loyal opposition. Before delving into the topic of disloyal opposition, the current state of affairs
should be discussed.
In September 2013, Bulat Abilov announced his resignation from politics. This
resignation is particularly significant due to the repute Abilov held in Kazakh politics. Abilov
was one of the most prominent opposition figures in the country.14 The former leader expressed
his desire to focus on documentary and book projects throughout Kazakhstan. His resignation
was precipitated by the disintegration of the alliance between his Azat party and OSDP Social
Democrats party. These events severely stifled Kazakh opposition with some claiming there was
no more functioning opposition to keep Nazarbayev in order.15 It will be interesting to see the
course of Kazakh politics and whether a new opposition will arise, or if the state will less be than
democratic. Other groups considered disloyal have been expelled from politics by the Kazakh
government, they will be mentioned in more detail below.
2. Disloyal Opposition: This analysis of disloyal opposition will be fairly brief due, to the
nature of the subject. Most disloyal opposition tends to be groups seeking to overthrow the state
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structure. Many of these groups are extremist and/or terrorist in nature and thus will be analyzed
in one of the following sections. The suspension of the CPK for its alliance with the Alga
opposition party raises questions about the unregistered Alga party. Alga stems from the
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK) movement that had been banned. The DCK was one of
the most powerful opposition forces before it declined in 2005 and was eventually banned. Since
then, Alga has tried on various occasions to register as a party with no success.16 In November
2012, the Kazakh government essentially declared Alga as a disloyal opposition by suspending
the group’s operations ahead of a trial seeking to label Alga as extremist.17 This categorization
came following the arrest of leader Vladimir Kozlov, who the government accused of inciting
ethnic, racial and religious hatred, as well as seeking a violent overthrow of the government.18
Kozlov was found guilty by a Kazakh court of the aforementioned allegations, while also being
found guilty of running a criminal organization and being culpable in the conflict in Zhanaozen
which saw 15 dead and approximately 100 hurt.19 Whether these accusations are true, or this is
shrouded political repression, the government banned the Alga organization and thus considered
it opposition not willing to work within the government framework. This case was revisited in
August 2013, when a review of the controversial trial and subsequent sentence was rebuffed by
Kazakhstan’s Supreme Court.20
Tablighi Jamaat is another group that has been expelled from the political landscape in
Kazakhstan. Tablighi Jamaat is an Islamic revivalist group with origins in India. This group has
influence throughout the world, with networks in North America, Europe, Central Asia, Africa,
South East Asia and the Pacific Islands.21 In February of 2013, the Kazakh government labeled
Tablighi Jamaat as an extremist group. This designation came following Russia, Uzbekistan and
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Tajikistan defining as the group as extremist.22 The Chairman of the Agency for Religious
Affairs wants Kazakhs citizens within the Jambyl oblast bordering Kyrgyzstan to resist the
ideology of the Tablighi Jamaat.23 The movement is seen as a damaging force to the country’s
stability.
Kazakhstan has banned both of the previously mentioned groups because they deem them
a threat to the state as a whole as opposed to the parties in power. From what I’ve gathered, the
actual threat of Alga to the state is questionable. This may be an effort to suppress opposition by
the less than democratic regime in Kazakhstan. Another aspect that likely factored in
Kazakhstan’s designation of Tablighi Jamaat as an extremist group was that a foreign incarnation
of Islam makes up the group’s ideology. The Islam of Kazakhstan differs from the revivalist
message of Tablighi Jamaat and this variation of Islam poses a threat to the state’s efforts to push
local traditions and moderate Islam. The influence of foreign Islam is of particular concern to
Central Asian governments, particularly the ideologies that seek to establish a caliphate. It is
important to understand how much influence foreign sources have on Islam in Central Asia.
III. Foreign Influence on religion in Kazakhstan and Central Asia
The fall of the Soviet Union left the new states with the challenge of dealing with
religious communities of the primarily Islamic region. I detailed the attempts by the Kazakh
government to involve a state friendly and moderate version of Islam. This attempt found
opposition in groups like KNIPA, but foreign sources were also able to influence Islam in
Kazakhstan.
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A. Foreign financial support in construction of religious infrastructure:
During the 1990s, foreign influences began putting money into the religious
infrastructure of Kazakhstan. The growth of religious institutions is in large part due to the
efforts of donors from foreign Muslim countries. This version of Islam did not necessarily fit into
the plans of Nazarbayev. The Islam that arrived in Kazakhstan due to the foreign investment
from various places throughout the Muslim world undermines the state’s role in domestic
religious rhetoric.
1. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Kuwait, etc: Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia provided
financial backing for the construction of mosques and madrassas in Kazakhstan. Many Kazakh
students have also received religious education in other Muslim countries, such as Pakistan.24
There are a few contrasting interests at play here. First, it must be noted that in 1995 the
constitution of Kazakhstan declared the country as a secular republic with restrictions on
religious political parties and foreign religious organizations. Nazarbayev sought to establish
Kazakhstan as a state that linked the Christian and Muslim worlds.25 The secularization of
Kazakhstan fashioned the state as a more favorable partner for the western powers, while the
Muslim population of the country provided a linkage with the Muslim world. The Post-Soviet
states of Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have
majority Muslim populations.26 A seemingly majority of religious adherents does not prevent the
operation of a secular state, but it does provide challenges. These challenges are especially
prevalent when extremism is tossed into the equation, and we must look back at the foreign
influence on Kazakhstan’s religious infrastructure to get a better sense of conflict between the
secular state and the most ardent of religious followers.
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B. Southern Kazakhstan and the border with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan:
Southern Kazakhstan provides a prime example of the passage of extremist ideology
through borders. Shared borders with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and near border proximity
with Tajikistan leaves Kazakhstan open to transnational terror emanating from these less secure
states. It is also important to note the Afghani border shared by Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The
role of groups with origins in countries making up Kazakhstan’s southern border will be
discussed further in a later paragraph, but the current focus remains on less regional influences.
After briefly establishing southern Kazakhstan’s vulnerability to Islamic extremism, one would
not be dumbfounded to find an institution systematically promoting radical Islam within the
region. The South Kazakhstan Humanitarian Academy was shut down by the Kazakh Ministry of
Education in 2004 due to the academy’s promotion of radical Islam within its curriculum. Just
like many mosques and other religious schools established in Kazakhstan, the academy was
funded by a foreign source. A charity based in Kuwait known as Jamaat al-Islah al-Ijtimai
funded the academy, this group was listed by Russia as a terrorist organization.27 Those that seek
to undermine the governments of Central Asia remain in the minority, yet southern Kazakhstan
exists in an area that is more vulnerable to religious extremism. Many extremist factions have
been more favorably received in this particular area, I will highlight who the significant groups
are and where they have had success.
C. Government seeks to limit the influence of foreign Islam
With evidence of imported Islam influencing and taught to several people throughout
Kazakhstan, the government and the SAMK have both acted to limit this influence. Instances
like the shutdown of the South Kazakhstan Humanitarian Academy underline the country’s
desire to limit extremist rhetoric and sources of foreign Islam. Events like this point to the
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Kazakh government’s influence on religious instruction. The practice of Islam is important in
Kazakhstan, but legally functioning religious institutions must promote Islam that is moderate in
nature and state friendly. A statement by Marat Azilkhanov, the head of Kazakhstan’s Agency
for Religious Affairs, in February 2014 sheds light on the amount of control the state believes it
has over Kazakh mosques. Azilkhanov said with certainty that the mosques in Kazakhstan are
not promoting radical Islamic ideals. He went on to state that all mosques are regimented by
imams from the SAMK and radicalization can be attributed to propaganda on the internet and
unofficial gatherings away from the mosques.28 The mention of the internet is quite interesting
due to the nebulous nature of the medium. Foreign organizations can propagate to anyone willing
to search deep enough. Kazakhstan has sought to undermine incarnations of foreign Islam by
promoting Kazakh traditions. Yerzhan Malgazhyuly, the chief mufti of Kazakhstan announced
2014 as "The Year of Religion and Traditions." This effort would include focusing on
developing the Kazakh language within the state, promoting Kazakh traditions and fostering
patriotism. President Nazarbayev declared his stance on the hijab, he described the covering as
well as the burqa as “alien” to Kazakhstan. The President described those honoring such alien
traditions as being led down the wrong path of Islam by external forces.29 The year 2014 appears
to be a year in which the state will push to capture the minds of the younger generation and push
them away from foreign sources of Islam.
As the state seeks to promote the traditions and stymie external influence, it is important
to identify the groups that promoted extremist ideology and thus undermine the government’s
efforts. Of the four groups that I will detail, three are currently functioning as extremists or terror
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organizations. I will begin with the IRP, a group that initially posed a threat to government
sanctioned Islam, but eventually fell into obscurity.
IV. Notable players of Islamism in Central Asia
A. Tajikistan’s Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP)
1. Origins following fall of U.S.S.R.: The main perpetuators of extremist rhetoric and
behavior within Central Asia, continue to be Hizb ut Tahrir al-Islami and the Islamist Movement
of Uzbekistan (IMU). Not only do these groups pose a threat to Kazakhstan’s stability and
security apparatus, but they compromise Central Asian security as a whole. Before delving
further into the origins and operations of the IMU and Hizb ut Tahrir (HT), a brief look into
Tajikistan’s Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP). The IRP is an interesting organization as it isn’t an
terrorist or extremist organization in the vein as the IMU or HT. The IRP was established during
the final months of the Soviet Union with the vision of being a pan-U.S.S.R. Islamic movement
while advocating for social issues, introduction of Islamic schools, and denouncing the official
form of Islam.30 This official form of Islam was hinted at earlier when referring to Nursultan
Nazarbayev’s efforts to bring Islam under the state.
2. Failure and Fall into obscurity: After the Soviet collapse, the party began to shy from
the pan-U.S.S.R. message and operated in Tajikistan. Referring back to the influence of foreign
groups on Central Asian affairs, it is imperative to mention the support the IRP received from the
Taliban from Afghanistan. This support allowed the IRP to engage in the brutal Tajik civil wars
of the 1990s.31 Foreign sources of extremism perpetuated the bloodshed of Tajikistan’s civil war
and this fact points to the danger groups, such as the Taliban, al Qaeda and HT pose to Central
Asia’s security. The IRP eventually faded into obscurity following the peace treaty of 1997. The

35

group earned recognition as a political party and their limited inclusion in the political system
softened the stance of the radical Islamists.32 Kazakhstan likely saw the integration of Islamists
into to the political system as a deterrent to radicalization. It is interesting to see the capability of
Islamist groups who no longer have substantial external support. The combination of political
representation and absence of significant financial support from radical elements may be a key to
crippling the extremist objectives of domestic Islamist groups.
B. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
1. Origins in Uzbekistan: The aforementioned solution is not realistically applicable to all
radical Islamist groups threatening the security and stability of Kazakhstan and Central Asia.
Some groups are more ardent in their ambitions to establish a caliphate within the region and
beyond. The IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir are significantly more dedicated to furthering their cause
than the Tajik party. Both groups have become significant players in Central Asia and have
operatives throughout the region including Kazakhstan. The IMU as its name suggests originated
in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan’s influence in the dissemination of Islamism throughout the region
cannot be written off, the state has the tradition of Islam of its neighbors in Central Asia.33 Uzbek
instability has allowed for groups such as the IMU to operate and expand. The movement was
established by Tahrir Yuldashev and Juma Namangani in the early 1990s; Namangani’s
legitimacy stemmed from his role in the Tajik Civil War, where he is described as fighting
bravely and skillfully alongside the IRP.34 The IMU undertook kidnappings and raids within
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the late 1990s and early 2000s. These acts of violence
characterized the IMU’s operations throughout the region.
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2. Operations: The IMU killed civilians and security forces in order to further their cause,
and as previously mentioned, claimed responsibility for the bombing of government buildings in
Tashkent, Uzbekistan.35 Most attacks undertaken by terror groups within the region are of
concern to Kazakhstan, but this particular attack in Tashkent is roughly 80 miles from the
southern Kazakh city of Shymkent. Terrorist activity in Uzbekistan and particularly Tashkent
undermine the security of the state, and the border with Kazakhstan. The threat of violence
diminished, but governments must remain vigilant and proactive especially considering the
various reports of the group reentering the region. The presumed death of Namangani during
bombing raids in northern Afghanistan left analysts pondering the direction the IMU would take
following such a significant loss.36
3. Leadership: Some analysts were unsure of the stability of the IMU following
Namangani’s death. Tahir Yuldashev took the helm as leader of the group. Prior to Yuldashev’s
ascension into the leadership role, he served as Namagani’s deputy.37 Working from Pakistan,
Yuldashev died from injuries following an airstrike in South Warizistan in August of 2009. His
death was denied by the IMU for nearly a year, but the group later confirmed the reported death,
and subsequently named Abu Usman Adil as their new leader in August 2010.38 During Adil’s
tenure as leader, he advanced the IMU’s standing in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Adil pushed for
more attacks outside of Pakistan, this included Central Asia and even Europe. Adil ultimately
suffered the same fate as his predecessor, as he was killed during a drone strike in Pakistan in
April 2012. Adil’s successor, Usman Ghazi, took over the IMU later in the summer of 2012. The
locations of the deaths of the previous leaders points to the ties the group has with Afghanistan
and Pakistan.
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4. Ties with Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Taliban: The group proved disruptive in
Central Asia and found refuge in a destabilized Afghanistan. It is important to note that while
basing their operations in Afghanistan their recruitment of militants was bolstered.39 It is not a
great leap to suppose the Uzbek group had the support of the prominent Islamist groups
infamously operating in Afghanistan. The IMU’s operations in Afghanistan once again point to
the significance external sources play in the supporting Central Asian extremist groups.
Afghanistan’s failing security apparatus allowed IMU leader Tahir Yuldashev a safe haven
following the bombings of Tashkent, which appeared to be an attempt to assassinate Uzbek
president Islam Karimov.40 Despite denials, the Taliban provided Yuldashev the freedom to
establish a militant training camp in northern Afghanistan where he was able to train Islamic
militants from Central Asia and Uighurs from Xinjiang province in China. The Taliban also
provided the IMU with weapons and allowed the group to financially support themselves
through drug trafficking.41
Pakistan is another base for the IMU and is credited with being the residence of the
IMU’s leadership. From the tribal areas, both the IMU and Pakistani Taliban organize raids.
While a significant portion of the IMU’s actions are currently based in these areas, the group
continues to focus on undermining security in Central Asia. One example of their intent was
found in the organization’s statement following an attack in Panjshir in May 2013.42 The IMU
coordinated a suicide attack in the northern region of Afghanistan. The attack involved members
from Central Asia, with a Kyrgyz and two Uzbeks taking part. Following this attack, the IMU
stated their desire for attacks in the Mawarounnahr region, which refers to present day
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan.43 This show of intent is important for
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Central Asian governments to monitor, especially when recent events in Pakistan are taken into
account.
Recent developments in Pakistan point to the growth in the relationship between the
Pakistani Taliban (TTP) and the IMU. The United States enacted a drone strike in early 2013.
The strike ended the life of Maulvi Nazir. Nazir was a leader in South Waziristan and was seen
as a threat to U.S. interests by providing safe haven for extremism and terror.44 Prior to his death,
Nazir forged a non-aggression pact with Pakistan’s government. This pact preceded an offensive
against the Taliban by Pakistan’s army. Nazir also opposed the presence of the IMU in South
Waziristan and even ordered his forces to drive out the IMU from the region.45 The IMU and
TTP have shown their ability to work together before and the elimination of a common rival is a
victory for both. Coordination between the two groups do not only pose a threat to Pakistan, but
surrounding regions including Central Asia. The IMU’s intention to return to the region and
commit attacks is of upmost concern to regional security, even more so when considering the
influence it has in the Central Asian states still.
5. Influence in Kazakhstan: The IMU continued to be a concern in Central Asia and
Kazakhstan has experienced this firsthand. In November 2004, a terrorist group operating in
Kazakhstan was dismantled by Kazakh security forces. The group had ties with the IMU as well
as al-Qaeda and consisted of citizens from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The group claimed they
played a role in a March 2004 attack on police in Tashkent and the subsequent suicide bombing
on the American and Israeli embassies in July later that year.46 Another interesting facet of this
arrest is that this group was able to cross the Uzbek-Kazakh border if their accounts are accurate.
This border crossing, although from 2004 points to the vulnerability of Kazakhstan’s border with
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southern neighbors that still persists. This coupled with Uzbekistan’s border with Afghanistan
proves to be an issue worth worrying about especially with the recent plans by the United States
to withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014. The Kazakh government also fears that its citizens
participating in conflicts in Afghanistan will look to coordinate with the Caucasus emirate and
radical Salafists upon returning to Kazakhstan.47 It will be important to see how regional powers
will react to these developments and how it will differentiate its response with violent groups
like the IMU and more propagandist groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami.
C. Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami
1. Origins: Hizb ut-Tahrir, commonly known as HT, is the leading extremist group based
in Central Asia. Analysts have described HT as a threat to Central Asia and even the west. Some
even expect the group to overtake al-Qaeda.48 Comparisons with al-Qaeda show the threat
analysts believe HT poses to international security. This assertion creates some confusion when
taking into account the non-violent stance of the group. The perception and actual verifiable
actions of HT will be taken into account in order to gauge whether the group poses a threat of
violence or simply undermines the state through propaganda and radical ideology. Although
highly active in Central Asia, HT was established in 1952 in Al-Quds according to the group’s
website. Al-Quds refers to Jerusalem where Palestinian scholar and judge, Taqiuddin al-Nabhani,
first formed the organization. The organization’s primary aim is the creation of a pan-Islamic
caliphate throughout the Middle East, Eurasia and South Asia.49 Restoration of Islamic thought
remains another integral aim as foreign influence and colonialism have been attributed with
undermining the purity of Islam.50 HT’s influence began to take hold in Uzbekistan following the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Jordanian missionaries are attributed with bringing the organization
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to Uzbekistan in the early 1990’s. Throughout the decade Uzbekistan became the base of HT in
Central Asia.51 HT spread throughout Central Asia particularly into Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and
Tajikistan. HT’s rhetoric grew within these countries which proved disruptive, but not disruptive
enough to warrant classification as a terrorist organization by important international players.
Despite the division in the classification of HT, the propaganda and aims of the group seek to
undermine the interest of regional and international governments.
2. Rhetoric, Goals and International classification: The group sought to bring about this
objective through non-violent means initially by exposing the corruption of regional
governments and providing literature which proved highly provocative and violent in its
solutions for the west and Jews.52 HT is an extremist group which holds radical views that are
derisive of regional governments, yet it has been relatively peaceful despite their extremist
rhetoric. This stance led the United States and the United Kingdom to shy away from the
categorization of HT as a terrorist organization. The U.S. recognizes that they haven’t been able
to directly link HT to any acts of violence or terror and there is also no paper trail linking HT to
financial support of terrorist activity.53 Conversely, some American think tanks believe HT
should be classified as such due to the influence their ideology has in creating Islamic militants
that threaten U.S. and regional interests.54 Under this assumption, HT is able to indoctrinate via
their ideology and inspire the young militants of more violent groups without engaging in
violence themselves. One important thing to remember is the relationship the United States has
with Central Asian states and particularly Kazakhstan. The two enjoy an amicable and mutually
beneficial relationship. Anti-Americanism and anti-western sentiment are not as widespread in
Central Asia as they are in the Middle East. One of the threats the HT poses to the U.S. and west
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in general is their rhetoric and ideology which undermines these established relationships. HT
was in a position to further spread their ideology of anti-Americanism by citing the engagements
in Afghanistan and Iraq. This propaganda was disseminated within the units and then passed on
to the general public. To better illustrate HT’s efforts to gain public support, I will outline the
leadership structure of the organization.
3. Leadership Structure: HT’s leadership is a bit more stable than that of the IMU. The
group is a global organization with chapters in countries throughout the world. With chapters
throughout the world it is hard to pinpoint one leader. The organization appears to have multiple
units with leaders heading smaller cells as opposed to one centralized group with one recognized
leader; this benefits the organization, especially in Central Asia where they are under firm
government scrutiny. In May 2013, the leader of an HT unit in Bishek, Kyrgyzstan was detained.
The leader was in possession of banned literature. He was subsequently investigated for inciting
racial, ethnic and religious hatred, while using extremist materials and symbols.55 Although the
group holds extremist views leaders want to gain the favor of the people of Central Asia. This
includes political involvement, engaging media and even charity for less fortunate segments of
society.56 This coupled with the localized nature of HT units presents the organization with a
greater chance of gaining influence.
4. Influence in Central Asia: HT popular support grew under the U.S. war in Iraq and the
role the U.S. plays in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is another cited example that assists in the
spread of HT’s ideology.57 In essence, HT as a group is less of a threat to the U.S. than their
message and ability to influence. HT realizes this as well and continue to use the pen as opposed
to the sword. If their ideology influences young Muslims to engage in terrorist activity it will be
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hard to refer to the group as terrorist since their message and actions are openly against these
methods. Yet, concerns of violence still exist due to onerous imprisonment and torture at the
hands of Central Asian authorities.58 Ahmed Rashid claims violence is inevitable considering the
repression of Central Asian governments. This may or may not prove to be true, but it is possible
that an extremist group can be as dedicated to not employing violence as others are committed
using it. HT’s current commitment to non-violence appears to be a strength and contributes
greatly to their three main objectives. The first part is the culturing stage where the group seeks
to persuade people while establishing a sound organization. The next stage includes a mass
communication with the Muslim world in order to establish an Islamic state in which the
adherents would adopt an Islamic lifestyle. The final stage is the creation of the pan-Islamic
caliphate in which the ideology of HT would be the political framework.59 The creation of such
conditions at this point remains unlikely, but any possibility of a population more conducive to
the anti-government sentiments espoused by HT depends on the presence of the organization
within Kazakhstan.
5. Presence in Kazakhstan: Despite their non-violent stance, HT is still an extremist
group that threatens the governments of Central Asia by seeking their overthrow although
through peaceful means. Although Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are subject to more terrorist
attacks than their northern neighbor, Kazakhstan is also subject to terrorist threat and extremist
rhetoric. HT’s contingent in Kazakhstan ranges from 200 to 5,000 members. Sympathizers are
also prevalent in the southern region of the country.60 Earlier reference was made to Uzbek
presence in Kazakhstan, particularly the southern region where groups like HT enjoy more
support. HT in Kazakhstan initially started with ethnic Uzbeks, but has over time included a
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large number of ethnic Kazakhs usually young males in the 20-30 age range HT activities
include the dissemination of leaflets throughout south Kazakhstan. These leaflets generally
provide information on the struggles of Muslims of other countries, like those in Uzbekistan and
the Chechens in Russia.61 Hizb ut Tahrir poses a threat to Kazakh security in a non-traditional
sense. HT’s methods of non-violence provide the U.S. and U.K. with little to no incentive to
label the organization as a terrorist group. Interestingly enough, China, Russia, Pakistan, the
Central Asian countries and some Middle Eastern powers categorize HT as a terrorist
organization.62 With no direct links to violence, at least from the U.S. perspective, the threat lies
in the battle for the hearts and minds of the people of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Some in the
southern region have embraced or unenthusiastically agreed with their message. It is possible
that economic success and increased democratic representation can stifle this message that
utilizes government corruption as a major talking point. This appeals to the negative perception
many Kazakhs hold towards their government. If a scenario materializes where the government
becomes more repressive and economic inequality prospers, HT’s message could gain more
popular appeal. The group is able to gain followers by appealing to the basic concerns of
inequality, corruption and government repression against Muslims. HT claims these issues would
be eliminated with the implementation of sharia, once again alluding to the pan-Islamic
Caliphate.63 History shows the popular adaptation of a radical agenda is more effective than
sporadic attempts at terror. Support for the implementation of sharia is approximately 1 in 10 in
Kazakhstan and significantly higher in neighboring Central Asia states. With that said, some
groups would much rather engage in violence to undermine the government rather than gaining
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support. In the same vein as the IMU, Jund al Khilafah uses violence to promote their aims in
Kazakhstan and Central Asia.
D. Soldiers of the Caliphate
1. Jund al Khilafah emergence: The Soldiers of the Caliphate terror organization,
otherwise known as Jund al Khilafah, is an emerging group within Central Asia. HT is the
current threat and IMU is regrouping, Jund al Khilafah has succeeded in putting itself on the
radar. 2011 marked the moment when the group coordinated multiple attacks in Kazakhstan.
Only one attack was particularly successful. The attack in Taraz left eight dead during an
encounter which included guns and a suicide bomber. This attack brought the group in the
consciousness of the Kazakh government. The group took responsibility for the attacks on online
Jihadi forums. Jund al Khilafah’s focus on Kazakhstan was revealed through video statements
critical of Nazarbayev’s regime. The criticism targeted new religious laws that the group claims
targets Muslims and the 2011 massacre in Zhanaozen.64
Despite previous assertions of the group originating in Afghanistan, Jund al Khilafah is
said to come from the North Caucasus region according to Kazakh political scientist Yerlan
Karin. Militants from the group were engaged in a shootout with Kazakh forces which resulted in
the death of two soldiers.65 The literature on this group is limited, but it does pose a threat going
forward especially with the fact that it coordinated a successful attack within Kazakhstan.
Despite the recent attacks, Kazakhstan remains more stable than its Central Asian neighbors.
When assessing the threats to Kazakh security the Fergana Valley is a particular region of
concern especially when one considers the interplay between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan.
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V. The Fergana Valley:
A. Location
1. Border Issues: The Fergana valley is an area spread across Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan.66 This region is the most densely populated in Central Asia. Fergana is of particular
interest of Kazakhstan for a few reasons. The valley’s location led to border issues during the
late 1990s and early 2000s as Central Asian states demarcated their boundaries. Uzbekistan
erected a 2 meter perimeter fence and created minefields to demarcate their territory.67 Fergana’s
location is significant due to the presence of Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and Tajiks. Particular organizations
first established legitimacy within one ethnic group and then spread their influence to the other
groups of the region.
2. Role of Ethnicity: There are perceptions that Fergana is a war torn region due to the
multiethnic nature of the area and a few isolated events in the past. The Uzgen, Osh round of
ethnic conflict and the assassinations of officials in 1997 were used by various outlets to portray
the region as an ethnic powder keg.68 Despite Heathershaw and Megoran’s position that
Fergana’s ethnic conflict has been sensationalized by western media outlets, it is important to
realize that these events do point to weaknesses in the security structure of the region. The role of
ethnicity must not be discarded in the grander scheme, but when referring to the operation of
terrorist and extremist groups the impact is slightly diminished. For example, HT is influential in
the Fergana valley and among the Uzbek population, but as of now there are Kazakhs, Tajiks and
even Russians being recruited by the organization.69 Earlier, I cited an example of an IMU cell
operating in Kazakhstan that was comprised of both Kazakhs and Uzbeks. As I stated previously,
the impact of ethnicity should be downplayed to an extent, but not thrown aside. The reason for
this assertion is that ethnic and national lines do play a part in identifying the effectiveness of
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groups like HT. For instance, we have already established that HT is a multiethnic movement
encompassing several groups from Central Asia and abroad, but in terms of the group’s
operation it has historically been more successful with the Uzbeks.
3. Presence of Extremist groups in Fergana: HT’s doctrine was first exported to
Uzbekistan in the late 1970s.70 Palestinians and Jordanians expanded HT’s rhetoric to
Uzbekistan while studying in the country’s higher institutions. This prior exposure gave HT a
groundwork of legitimacy on which to build upon when the next wave of HT influence arrived in
the early to mid-1990s. The group began to expand in the Fergana valley when a Jordanian
distributed HT literature among the Uzbek population. These efforts have made HT strongest in
Uzbekistan and according to 2010 estimates up to 60,000 supporters are Uzbek.71 A reason why
Fergana proved to be a valuable launch point for the growth of Islamist rhetoric in Central Asia
is the cross section of ethnicities in the valley. The people of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan are traditionally more religious than their Kazakh and Turkmen counterparts.72 That is
not to say that Kazakhs and Turkmen are impervious to religious extremism, but it must be noted
the historical nomadic nature of these two groups made the religious indoctrination of
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan more difficult than the process was in Fergana. However HT has
been successful in their endeavor to expand from Fergana into the rest of Central Asia by
effectively establishing itself in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and further into
Uzbekistan.73 The significant issue with the Fergana Valley has been its strategic location. The
mountains provide an obvious geographical advantage, with the cross-section of three Central
Asian borders providing a launching point for extremist action in the region.
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4. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s border and potential Kazakhstan spillover:
The border Uzbekistan and Tajikistan share with Afghanistan makes the previous assertion dire.
The spread of extremist Islam is more of a task to tackle when there are multiple borders of entry
and multiple areas in which extremism and anti-government action is able to function. The
severe crackdown on protesters in the city of Andijan by the Uzbek government in 2005 is a
prime example of this. The government crackdown simply made extremists move to the Tajik
and Kyrgyz sections of the valley. This makes detention of militants more difficult, but it also
provides the opportunity for their entrance into other states of Central Asia.74 The Fergana valley
is also considered a stage where the government and militant violence can ignite. One of the
reasons is that governments use the threat of extremism to justify their sometimes excessive
responses. In their efforts to stifled extremism in Fergana they may be actually inspiring it.
Rashid Ahmed notes that if the IMU enter the valley with security forces in pursuit, the nonviolent HT would not sit by and watch them be killed.75 The “inevitable” incitement of HT is
prophesized by Ahmed, and if this scenario were to materialize it would not be a great leap to
assume a wider encompassing crackdown by the Kazakh government on HT and similar groups
and/or an in tune response by the Islamists within the state. In essence, the Fergana valley
provides a landmark in which all powers of Central Asia should be mindful of. The Islamist
rhetoric is more accepted in this region, and despite a past of ethnic dispute, extremist groups act
across national borders and with varying ethnicities with the ultimate goal of overthrowing
regional governments and establishing an Islamic Caliphate. The events in Andijan in 2005 are a
prime example of a government’s failed attempt at combatting local extremism.
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B. Andijan
Andijan is a city in Uzbekistan and the capitol of the province bearing the same name.
Andijan is located in the Fergana Valley and the city is in close proximity to the Uzbek-Kyrgyz
border. I previously mentioned the more favorable conditions within Fergana that allow
extremism more opportunity to grow. Aware of these circumstances, the Uzbek government took
a hardline against Islam in the region. The massacre in Andijan was a brutal crackdown by the
Uzbek government.
1. Andijan Massacre: The circumstances leading up to the massacre involved the arrest of
23 local businessmen. These men were taken in under suspicions of Islamic extremism. The trial
resulted in four months of protest by the local population. On May 12th several proponents of the
businessmen were arrested during the protest. Armed men blitzed the jail the next morning and
free the accused as well as their supporters. Later that day a large demonstration with
approximately 10,000 participants captured the city center. Although there was an armed
presence the demonstration was a channel for locals to voice their opinion on political, social and
economic issues as well as stating their dissatisfaction with the Uzbek government.76 Uzbek
security forces attempted to disperse the crowd and began an assault by firing on the
demonstration via a convoy of armored vehicles. Reports say the security forces carried out
further killings and executed the injured. On May 14th, President Karimov holds a press
conference in the capital where he blames the violence on Islamic extremists and claims they
used children and women as human shields.77 International estimates put the death toll at
anything between 700 and 1,500 casualties. Karimov went on the offensive with the government
putting the death total at 187 casualties, much lower than the estimates from the international
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community. The Uzbek president also stated that the casualties came from the Islamic extremists
who were instructed by foreign sources. Karimov denied access to Fergana to journalists and
even expressed discontent with those reporting on the events objectively.78 Karimov’s stance on
the massacre and the actual event itself points to two significant issues that evolve from
government crackdowns on terror and extremism.
2. Post-massacre: In my estimation the Andijan massacre is significant to the war on
terror for two reasons. The first issue revolves around the ethical question posed to many
international allies of Uzbekistan. Do the strategic benefits of a partnership with Uzbekistan
outweigh the negative actions of the Uzbek government? The United States, United Kingdom
and European Union dealt with this dilemma. This was especially significant to the U.S.
considering their leadership role in the war on terror and the usefulness of Uzbekistan in the
context of the engagement in Afghanistan. The Uzbek government obstructed efforts of
independent investigation as requested by the international community. The government also
continued to claim the death toll was 187 instead of above 700.79 This became an issue of human
rights and provided many states with a moral and strategic quandary. In many circles Karimov
was seen as a liability even though his actions were in his estimation anti-extremist. These
repressive tactics are not an anomaly for Uzbekistan, in fact prior to September 11th Karimov
was described as using tactics such as show trials, forced confessions and torture to maintain his
power.80 The question of sustaining partnerships with repressive regimes in hopes of maintaining
security and stability remain prevalent today. The uprisings against governments in Egypt, Libya
and Syria are prime examples of the blowback. One fear that is becoming more ubiquitous is the
presence of extremist and in some cases terrorist elements in the opposition. From a moral
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standpoint, the U.S. and many other states now believe aiding the opposition may be better than
supporting violent despots. One concern that arises if opposition forces manage to oust the sitting
government is the possibility of radical elements infiltrating the new regime. Effective border
management will deter the spread of these radical elements, but an actual commitment to human
rights will also grant the Central Asian governments with more support on domestic and
international levels.
A major reason Central Asian governments need to maintain a balance between human
rights and cracking down on extremist elements is radicalization. I delve deeper into the topic of
radicalization in a later chapter, but will provide a short overview of how the government
contributes to radicalization. When monitoring religious and political groups, governments must
be cautious and avoid radicalizing less extremist groups with brutal repression. This is
particularly significant when you consider the propaganda of groups such as HT. I mentioned
earlier that HT detailed government corruption, repression and economic inequality. These
accusations are further entrenched when one looks at the events in Andijan in May 2005, and this
is a likely reason the Uzbek president wanted to control media coverage of the events. These
tactics do not alleviate regional extremism, but actually reinforces it and gives credence to antigovernment propaganda disseminated by extremist groups.
VI. Conclusion:
A. The threat of Radical Islam to Central Asia
The spread of radical Islam within Central Asia is a concern. We now know that foreign
sources have influenced the dissemination of extremist rhetoric and it has thrived in areas such as
the Fergana Valley. Hotbeds like Fergana have provided launching points for the expansion of
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extremist groups, both violent and non-violent, into the rest of Central Asia. Kazakhstan in large
part has been able to avoid acts of terror more consistently than Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, but
there have been reported incidents, foiled plots and militant capture.
1. Recent Attempts in Kazakhstan: In Astana, a criminal court began the trial of six
people who are accused of plotting a terrorist attack on an Opera theatre that has been under
construction in the city in May of 2013. Further accusations include attempt to plot a bomb
attack, intimidation of the population, establishing a terrorist cell and undermining Kazakh
security structure.81 In December 2012, another cell was accused of plotting attacks against nonMuslim officers in Kazakhstan’s law enforcement agencies to obtain their weapons and push for
the establishment of a caliphate. The group is also suspected of planning to create improvised
explosive devices and selling stolen property to help fund Chechen militants in Russia.82 The
government also claimed the groups sought to further attacks in Astana. These allegations are
concerning not only because of the harm they mean to implement, but also the location in which
they are being plotted. Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, is located in the northern region of the
country. It is a strategic position for the government and these plots show that even though the
southern region may be a breeding ground for extremism, the north and particularly the capital is
certainly a target. Kazakhstan’s former capital, Almaty, is also at threat from terror.
Kazakhstan’s prosecutor general reported that eliminated members of a criminal group that
adopted religious extremism ideology plotted several attacks on Kazakhstan. The group is also
being held responsible for a house explosion in a nearby town that killed four women and five
children.83 The threat to Kazakhstan is further emphasized when you consider a recent report
regarding Kazakhstan’s Special Forces. It is estimated that the Kazakh Special forces prevented
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24 terror acts from January to October 2012 according Deputy Prosecutor Iogan Merkel. In total
112 crimes in the country have been linked with terrorism and in the past 5 years 40 citizens
have been detained in other countries under the suspicion of working with terrorist groups.84 This
not only underlies the threat of extremism to Kazakhstan, but to Central Asia as a whole. The
fact that Kazakh nationals are being detained for suspicion of terrorism in other countries points
to the impact of foreign influence on Kazakhstan’s security structure. Merkel also stated the 68
members of international terrorist groups have been detained in Kazakhstan in the past 5 years as
well.85 This information must be taken with knowledge that Kazakhstan refers to HT as a
terrorist organization. With that said, the terrorist threat and rise of extremism is a very real
concern for Kazakhstan.
2. Growing Threat: It is clear that operations are not confined to the southern region of
the country anymore and expansion into the rest of the territory must be met with concerted and
effective efforts by Kazakhstan’s Special Forces. The relationship Kazakhstan has built with the
United States will prove vital in the fight against terror in the region and the U.S. view of
Kazakhstan as the favored partner in the region attest to the bond created between the two. The
IMU and HT will be of concern to all of the Central Asian powers, especially with the increased
presence of the IMU in the Fergana Valley in recent months. There are also plans to continue
recruiting militants into the region and a member of Uzbekistan’s national security service has
stated that the group is training militants in border districts of Afghanistan and Pakistan that may
be utilized in Central Asia. Transportation of militants into the valley has already started and
there have been arrests of IMU members moving through Tajikistan.86 Movement through
Tajikistan can indicate the transport of militants trained in Afghanistan. It will be of great
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importance that Kazakhstan acts in conjunction with regional and international allies to stop the
fermentation of militant movement into the Fergana Valley. We have seen that extremism from
Fergana can spread into surrounding areas, even Kazakhstan. Although HT is currently nonviolent the continued suppression of the group may push them to action. This combined with the
growth of the IMU in Fergana may prove pivotal in the war on terror in Central Asia. The
government may need to alter its stance on the group. If the government confronts the IMU in
Fergana, HT may jump to action as prophesized by Ahmed Rashid. The stability of Kazakhstan’s
security structure and continued success of their special forces is contingent on the stability of its
neighbors and its dealings with groups such as Hizb ut Tahrir.
Effective border management is an important facet in maintaining the security of the
Central Asian states. The border infrastructure is still under construction throughout the region,
but Kazakhstan has been a leader with relatively better equipped and trained agencies than their
regional counterparts.87 As Kazakhstan continues to grow its border infrastructure and other
regional states seek to raise their standards, the battle against regional terror and extremist groups
is potentially more promising. Equipping border agencies and counterterror efforts strengthens
those seeking to undermine the movement of militants and their operations. Yet this is simply
one facet in battling the impact of groups looking to undermine security in Central Asia. The
issue of trafficking is another challenge that must be dealt with in order to weaken extremist
groups involved in and benefitting from the illicit trade.
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Chapter III: Trafficking in Kazakhstan and Central Asia
I. Introduction
The growth of radical religious operations within Kazakhstan and Central Asia are not
the only concern to the region. The element of criminal activity is of significant concern to
regional governments. The main issues I seek to address are narcotics trafficking and arms
smuggling. The preceding issues contribute to the volatility of the region in different ways.
Narcotics, arms and human trafficking undermine security in and of itself, but when these factors
combine with elements, such as the rise of radical Islam in Central Asia, the threat takes on
another dimension. It is important to analyze these ties and discover how they contribute to the
overall stability of Kazakhstan and the region.
A. The threat Drug trafficking and Arms smuggling pose to the region
Cross-border trafficking generally has a destructive effect on security structures.
Enforcement agencies can be strained for resources or undermined through internal means. Take
the current situation at the American-Mexican border for example. Although these regions are on
different sides of the world they share significant similarities. One shared feature is the culture of
corruption that exists in the enforcement institutions of both regions. The issue of loose weapons
is another challenge that plagues both areas. There is a difference in the violence that afflicts
Central Asia and the violence of the American-Mexican border. While criminal cartels are armed
and profit from the narcotic trade in this region, militant Islamic groups gain from the narcotics
and arms trade in Central Asia.
1. Central Asia: Trafficking is a significant threat to Central Asian security issues for
various reasons. The increased quantity of illegal weapons and drugs in a country can vastly
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undermine the security structure of the state, this affects the state in question and regional
neighbors. One must take into account the other existing security challenges the region’s states
face to better understand the potential damage continued illegal trafficking can cause. One of the
overwhelming issues that was previously discussed is the rise of radical Islam. Hizb ut tahrir and
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan come to mind. The societal impact of drug trafficking is
another challenge that governments must deal with. The risks trafficking poses to the region
include the threat of transnational terror and violence, but internal deterioration is also a
legitimate consequence as well. Degradation within one state will likely have some impact upon
its neighbors, so the transnational impact must be taken into account.
2. Kazakhstan: The position of Kazakhstan in regards to narcotics and arms trafficking
within Central Asia and beyond is more centered on the actual country than the threat of
terrorism and militant Islam. Kazakhstan still remains under threat from terrorist activity, but the
epicenter of said activity derives from Kazakhstan’s southern neighbors and is slowly but surely
infiltrating its way into the former Soviet republic. The country’s geographic position makes it a
prominent player in the movement of arms and particularly drugs. Illegal trafficking poses a
threat to the Kazakh security structure in different ways. Border security is undermined as
weapons, drugs and even humans are able to pass through. This points to weakness on multiple
fronts. For example, the border security apparatus may not be developed enough to repel the
movement of weapons and narcotics from various borders. Institutional participation is also a
potential explanation with the possibility of corruption within the ranks of Kazakhstan’s and
regional border security forces.
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B. The International Aspect
When analyzing the impact of trafficking in Central Asia it is vital to understand the
influence of other regional players, like Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Knowledge of the European
market is also integral to the understanding of Central Asia’s trafficking problem, particularly
concerning narcotics. I will begin by introducing the influence of Central Asian state Tajikistan
and Afghanistan which is the epicenter of the regional drug trade.
1. Afghanistan and other regional players: Afghanistan is a major player in the
transnational crime and terror organizations that pose a legitimate threat to the Central Asian
states. The volatility that has thrived in Afghanistan for the last decade is a contributing factor to
the growth in trafficking emanating from the south Asian country. Opium, which is the basis in
drugs like heroin, morphine and certain pills, is produced in mass in Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s
topography and geography contribute to large output of opium, but another factor has a positive
correlation. The legacy of war in Afghanistan is a contributing factor to the export of the drug.
Instability, destroyed infrastructure and limited economic opportunities are exacerbated by
armed conflict and countries like Colombia and Afghanistan have been global leaders in drug
production. Peru and Burma also had a significant narcotic output and both similarly have a
legacy of war as well.1 The accumulation of weapons in Afghanistan over two decades is also a
concern to the Central Asian states. Weapons from Tajikistan’s civil wars further intensify the
threat of arms trafficking in the region, with states concerned about cross-border movement.2
2. Europe’s Role: Traffickers of these drugs need a large market for their large crop and
their northern neighbors provide a significant consumer base. Europe is an important consumer
of illegally trafficked narcotics deriving from states like Afghanistan. In many cases these
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narcotics make it to Russia after being trafficked through various Central Asian states. The
narcotics are then trafficked throughout Europe, particularly consumer rich Western Europe.3
Europe is a significant financial base for those in the narcotics business which in many cases can
be terror organizations.
II. Arms Trafficking:
A. Is the trafficking of arms a major threat to Central Asia?
Assessing the threat of loose weapons in Central Asia is important due to the current war
on terror. This threat is much different than the challenges following the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. During this era, weapons of mass destruction were the major problem. The current threat
is less serious, but remains a dangerous challenge.
1. Within Post-Soviet Central Asia: Assessing the threat of arms trafficking in Central
Asia is a complicated task. The current level of arms trafficking in Central Asia seems miniscule
when comparing to the threat of nuclear proliferation that characterized the region in the 1990s
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The focus of Russia and the United States were on
Kazakhstan during this period. The Central Asian nation inherited nuclear weapons through the
Soviet Union and held a larger nuclear arsenal than both France and the United Kingdom
combined.4 This situation was much tenser than the current scenario which involves the transport
of small arms within Central Asia. With that said, the danger posed by small arms is nothing to
disregard. In the current era, small arms account for the majority of deaths in combat and noncombat situations. These weapons are largely used in the low intensity conflicts that have been
prominent following the end of the Cold War. These types of weapons are also more readily
accessible than their large nuclear counterparts.5 This accessibility partnered with the growth of
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militant movements within Central Asia can prove troublesome for regional governments as well
as Kazakhstan. The presence of IMU cells in Kazakhstan provide a particular concern. The
situation in Afghanistan greatly impacts many of the security issues of the Central Asian states
and this is perhaps where the trafficking of small arms is most concerning.
2. Afghani-Tajik border: Following two decades of war Afghanistan is home to an
estimated millions of accumulated small weapons.6 The shared border with Tajikistan gives these
weapons an entry point to Central Asia through Tajikistan’s borders with Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan. Although Tajikistan provides a route for the illegal movement of weapons from the
wars in Afghanistan, the country also holds a significant amount of weapons following their own
civil war.7 These weapons have a pathway through Central Asia, but the threat is not an
overwhelming one at this point. What concerns many is the potential weapons that could enter
the region
B. Future Concerns:
One of the main arguments regarding the illicit trafficking of weapons is about the
potential challenges that may arise. These challenges put the populations of Central Asia at risk
and strengthens the destructive power of growing militant groups.
1. Growth: There is growing concern regarding the increase in weapons in Central Asia.
This is particularly concerning when one takes into account the growth of extremism within the
region as detailed in the previous chapter. Military grade assault rifles have become increasingly
accessible. This raised concerns from governments over terrorist groups, criminal syndicates and
rebel groups acquiring these loose weapons. Higher caliber weapons such as mortars, anti-tank
weaponry and shoulder fired rocket launchers have fallen into the hands of such groups. This
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leaves some police forces vulnerable as they may not be able to match firepower with some of
these better equipped non-state groups.8 Socioeconomic factors may also contribute to an
increase in arms smuggling. For example, poverty can make involvement in arms trafficking
more of an attractive option. One does not even have to transport the weapons to be complicit in
the movement of arms throughout the region. A person may be persuaded to look away or stay
quiet in return of financial gain. This is also a significant factor in narcotics trafficking and will
be revisited. The financial incentive has contributed to the further corruption of the weapons
industry in the post-Soviet states. Organized criminal groups have been attracted by the prospect
of large illegal revenues and many local governments have been complacent due to their own
vested interest and profit from arms trafficking. Although the current trafficking of arms in
Central Asia is not a major threat in the same vein as nuclear arsenals in the 1990s, the issue
must be addressed with precision due in large part to the growth of extremism.
2. Militant use: The issue of loose weapons and the rise of terrorist, extremist and other
anti-state groups can combine with negative effect. An increase in trafficked weapons in Central
Asia is likely to provide non-state groups with more equipment. This would undermine the
security of all Central Asian states and put their populations in danger. A better equipped
opposition of militants could be disastrous as witnessed by the Tajik Civil War where the IMU
fought along the IRP against government forces.9 The IMU still active is and is expected to be
increasing their influence in the Fergana Valley. Although arms trafficking may not be the
primary concern, governments should fight the corruption that keeps the illegal transfer of
weapons operational.
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3. Solutions: Tackling the illegal movement of small arms will be difficult due to the
ingrained corruption of various Central Asian institutions. The financial benefit of allowing
weapons to be trafficked appeals to those in power as well as the impoverished. As long as
significant financial benefit exists from the trafficking of weapons there will be people willing to
keep the illicit activity alive. Dealing with issues such as corruption and poverty is arduous and
complex, but remedying these problems could go a long way towards resolving the illegal
trafficking of arms.
III. Trafficking narcotics in Central Asia:
The illicit transit of narcotics through Central Asia is in my summation the greatest
trafficking threat in the region. The trade empowers the groups that destabilize the region, such
as criminal syndicates and terror organizations. These groups and narcotics users themselves
perpetuate the flow of narcotics and thus contribute to degradation of Central Asia security.
A. Impact of Drug Trafficking:
Narcotics trafficking has a significant impact on Central Asia. The financial aspect
cannot be ignored as it plays the largest role in perpetuating the flow of narcotics through Central
Asian states and onto Europe. The vast amount of profit made and the continuation of narcotics
trade shows that the financial gains outweighs the societal ills, even when those ills include the
growth of crime and HIV transmission.
1. Financial Impact: Following the growth of political Islam and extremism, narcotics
trafficking is one of the most significant challenges to Central Asian security. It provides
problems on institutional, social and political levels. One of the most notable facets about
narcotics trafficking is the financial impact it has on Central Asia and as well as other regions.
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Afghanistan is the nucleus of Central Asia’s drug trade. The large yield of opium poppies in
Afghanistan are the largest contributing factor, but the border it shares with Tajikistan is a key
access point into Central Asia. Afghani producers are greatly aided by the trafficking of opium
which is then used in the manufacture of drugs such as heroin. I previously mentioned the large
market in Western Europe for this illegal export; it would clarify matters further if numbers are
added to elucidate the financial impact. The transport from the Tajik border to the markets of
Western Europe is exhibited in appendix B6. According to the CIA Factbook, Afghanistan’s
legal exports in 2000 were approximately $80 million. These exports included dried fruits,
carpets and nuts. Compare this with the $120 million value of their opium crop if it were sold at
its lowest price. This value is further increased when the drugs make it to the streets of major
global cities like New York, Moscow and London. At this point the value is estimated at $100
billion.10 These estimates from 2000 are jarring when you consider that heroin output has
reportedly increased. There is certainly money to be made by those willing to take the risk and in
many cases low wages and lack of employment can lead civilians from all of the Central Asian
states to take part in the multi-billion dollar illicit industry. I will reference Tajikistan once again
to provide an example of the financial allure of narcotics trafficking. Aram Roston speaks of a
local Tajik father of five who had trouble achieving reemployment. The man previously worked
as a driver making less than $2 a day. After months of unemployment the man was presented
with an opportunity to earn $20 by transporting a half-kilo of heroin to a prearranged rendezvous
point. The man was ultimately caught, but the account points to the desperation in many of the
destitute people of Central Asia. During this time period many of the households in the former
Soviet Union were earning around $10 per month.11 The incentive is certainly present. One must
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also consider the profit margins of drug sales. Profit margins are at 1000 percent and experts
from the United Nations claim annual turnover from of the narcotic industry ranges from $55
million to $400 million. Experts also state that the amount of drug addicts has increased 10 times
from 1997-2007. Drug dealers have profited from these circumstances and their annual income
global ranges from $8 to $18 million. The International Monetary Fund claims that an estimated
1.5 trillion drug dollars are laundered annually.12 Although Kazakhstan is one of the most
financially successful states in Central Asia, it does not grant them immunity from similar
scenarios. Compliance in narcotics trafficking can arise from desperation, corruption and the
threat of violence. The vast narcotics market unsurprisingly affects Central Asia and global
society.
2. Societal impact: The narcotic industry may provide quick riches to those involved, but
it also has a degenerative effect on Central Asian society. Drug abuse is an obvious issue.
Despite states in the region being conduits for drugs going to Western Europe and Russia they
are also subject to the ills of narcotics consumption. Kazakhstan is one of those affected. In
March 2003, estimates from the Ministry of Health Care put the amount of drug addicts in
Kazakhstan at just under 50,000. 70 percent of the reported addicts were heroin users. Other
estimates put the number of addicts at 250,000. This is not an unbelievable claim considering the
amount of trafficked narcotics that remain in Kazakhstan. 30 percent of the drugs trafficked into
Kazakhstan remain in the country, while the majority of the remaining percentage is transported
to Russia.13 In 2007, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime informed the health
ministers of Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia to prepare for a rise in deaths from heroin
overdose. This warning came on the heels of a massive spike in the production of heroin from
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Afghanistan. This escalation would result in an increased purity of street heroin which would
cause many addicts to overdose as they would not be able to handle the higher concentration of
heroin.14
3. HIV/AIDS: Overdoses and addiction are not the only societal consequences of the drug
trade. The rate of HIV and AIDS infections has increased. The United Nations narcotics control
board states that over 40,000 people are infected with the HIV/AIDS. The majority of those
infected have obtained the virus through the injection of heroin.15 The continued growth of
narcotics trafficking within Central Asia is perpetuating the intensification of the virus.
Kazakhstan is leading the region in HIV infection rates and has an HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of
.14 percent as of 2004. At first glance this percentage may seem infinitesimal. One must consider
the size of Kazakhstan’s population and then compare that to the rest of the region. Kazakhstan’s
.14 percentage was greater than the four neighboring countries combined.16 One can speculate on
the contributing factors of this reality. An overwhelming majority of those infected with HIV are
within the age range of 15-29. 8 out of 10 of the infected are males although the rate at which
women are being infected is increasing. These statistics would be much ado about nothing if not
for the fact that the majority of these cases are the result of heroin consumption, thus a direct
result of the Central Asian drug trade. HIV infections through risk behavior with drug injection
stands at 83 percent, this dwarfs the infection rate of sexual transmission which stands at 9
percent. HIV infections happen throughout all of Kazakhstan’s oblasts, but the regions of
Karaganda and Pavlodar account for 70 percent of infections.17 It is important to note the
locations of both of these oblasts. Karagandy is close in proximity to the capital Astana, while
Pavlodar is near the northeastern border with Russia. Kazakhstan’s location along various
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trafficking routes has certainly contributed to the social problems of the country. One
consequence is the number of drug users and those in rehabilitation centers which is increasing
annually. These trends show the effects of heroin and opium consumption throughout
Kazakhstan, due to the Central Asian drug trade, but there are other challenges aside from the
health risks narcotics brings.
B. Trafficking and Institutional Corruption
Trafficking is not simply an underground activity in which smugglers must outwit law
enforcement to maintain their revenue stream. In many cases enforcement officials take part in
the illicit action as they benefit financially. Financial benefit is the primary motivating factor in
corruption although the threat of violence also causes enforcement cooperation.
1. Origins: Trafficking opium and other narcotics was not always the obvious illicit
objective for Central Asia. During Soviet rule the opium poppy grew wild in the region. The
Soviet government would embark on eradication efforts to destroy the annual opium crop. Many
Central Asians believed the government benefited from the narcotics trade and describe the
eradication as half-hearted, stating that if the government were truly committed to getting rid of
the crop it would have been done in a more efficient manner. Despite these perceptions, the
Soviets vastly limited the production of opium in Central Asia by the 1990s. Following the fall
of the Soviet Union many in Central Asia governments sought to continue the efforts against the
drug trade while others saw Central Asia transition from a potential producer to a strategic transit
point.18 The transition of Central Asia as a major player in narcotics trafficking saw the growth
of institutional involvement in illicit activity.
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2. Institutional Corruption: One of the major perpetuators of narcotics trafficking in
Central Asia is corruption in varying institutions that are supposed to be inherently opposed to
such illicit activity. The dissemination of corruption throughout various levels of government
makes the battle against trafficking more complex. There is involvement at the lower levels of
enforcement such as the police, border and customs agencies. Involvement of government
officials in corruption hinders the campaign against trafficking. The process in which people
obtain many of these positions of power also points to the corruption of law enforcement
institutions. Throughout Central Asia, prospects pay thousands of dollars to obtain entry-level
positions within law enforcement.19 These bribes are commonly seen as investments due to the
prospect of making much more money from the acquired positions. Generally this return on
investment would not come via legal means unfortunately. Corrupted members of law
enforcement can make money in multiple fashions. They may be approached by smugglers in
which case a collaborative relationship is forged which allows the passage of narcotics, weapons
and other trafficked commodities. This is not to accuse the majority of enforcement officials of
being engaged in bribery. Some agents are threatened with death and many are not willing to risk
their well-being for $200 a month. Another method of bribery arises when suspected smugglers
and couriers are detained. The law enforcement official can seek bribes to make cases against
detainees go away.20 This promotes an atmosphere of institutional corruption that if unchecked
can become a significant threat to the states of Central Asia and beyond. For example, the
prosecution of drug-related crime by corrupt officials in Russia appears to perpetuate the
movement of narcotics. The prosecution of these crimes are heavily geared toward the drug user
as opposed to the drug dealers. The payment of bribes is one of the limited options the
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prosecuted users have at their disposal.21 The disproportionate nature of prosecution in this
scenario presumes a symbiotic relationship between drug dealers and local enforcement in
Russia and throughout Central Asia. That is not to say that dealers are not prosecuted, but they
are more financially established and would more likely be able to provide payment to law
enforcement in order to maintain their revenue stream.
3. Financial situation: Revenue is the primary motivating factor for this level of
corruption. Those officers that bribed their way into law enforcement use the bribes to increase
on their meager salaries. Once again there is an opportunity to seize a small piece of an
astronomical industry. The amount of money changing hands in narcotics trafficking can prove
too tempting to resist for some in positions of authority. Recall the point I made in a previous
paragraph concerning the potential profit margins in drug trafficking. A kilogram of opium in
Afghanistan can cost $30, that same amount can go possibly $30,000 in Russia and potentially
increase to 5 times that amount sold in smaller units in Western Europe.22 In many cases a
portion of the bribe money is distributed to the law enforcement official’s boss. This illicit
money can then continue up to higher officials. Some of these officials use this money to
maintain or strengthen their positions, the nature of corruption is exhibited here.23 Bribery and
extortion are handled by lower levels of enforcement and the profits move up the hierarchy to the
higher levels of institutional administration. It is a challenge for governments to compete with
the potential salaries corruption would provide and in certain cases government officials would
be negatively impacted by a genuine crackdown on corruption. The various levels in which
corruption operates is another complicating factor. Another integral element in the perpetuation
of institutional corruption is the maintenance of a perception of effort. Central Asia is not a
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lawless region where traffickers have taken over governments to effortlessly smuggle drugs to
Europe. A view of the anti-trafficking equipment on the Kazakh-Russian border is shown in
appendix A5. Many times these efforts are genuine, but there are also several occasions where
arrests and seizures occur artificially just to reach specific quotas. This also portrays a dedication
to counter-narcotics operations to international players with vested interests in the region like the
United States.24
C. The Criminal Element
Another consequence of narcotics trafficking is the expansion of criminal activity. Aside
from the compliance of several members of law enforcement, trafficking of narcotics increases
drug related crime locally. The role of criminal organizations in the drug trade must also be
mentioned, although they do not carry as much of a destructive factor as terror groups.
1. Impact on Crime: The impacts narcotics trafficking has on crime are generally
obvious. The increase in drug dealing and drug use are a few that immediately come to mind.
These crimes contribute to other infractions on the local level.25 These lower level crimes are not
a significant threat to the state security structure, but it is important to realize that drug use and
addiction is affecting younger segments of the population.26 Another interesting trend is the
growth of women being charged in drug-related incidents. Poor women generally from rural
areas are allured into drug trafficking as couriers. In many cases these women are simply used as
cover for the more prominent traffickers. This process allows the compliant customs agents to
make arrests on the targeted women while letting the higher profile targets pass through. This has
attributed to the increase of women in Central Asian prisons. Domestic violence related to drug
use is another rising phenomenon.27
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2. Criminal organization: The threat of criminal organizations in the narcotics trade
varies. Criminal organizations do not pose the same threat a terrorist or extremist organization
would. They do not see the dissolution of the state as their main objective. These groups would
rather maintain some semblance of stability to ensure the continuation of their profits from
trafficking. One scenario that is concerning some experts is the possible growth of a relationship
between transnational crime organizations and terrorist factions. There has been a semblance of
collusion as some criminal groups have hired members of the IMU to help them understand drug
routes.28 Yet, a merger between these types of groups does not seem like a probable outcome, but
the possibility deserves mentioning. The threat of criminal organizations trying to corrupt
Central Asia institutions is limited in my opinion due to the current state of many regional
institutions. Criminal organizations are present in trafficking, but the terrorist element is much
more threatening to regional security.
IV. Trafficking and Terrorism
The greatest concern regarding narcotics trafficking in Central Asia is the role it plays in
the expansion of terrorism. Trafficking of both narcotics and arms contributes to the capability of
terror groups in different ways. Both methods of trafficking allow for outside sources of
militancy to influence groups within Central Asia.
A. Support for Terrorism
Trafficking supports terrorism in a few ways. The expansion of weapons through the
region provides militant groups with larger arsenals to combat the state with. Narcotics proves
more significant because it allows terror groups to support themselves financially. Financial
stability aids in the recruitment efforts, propaganda and armament of terrorist organizations.
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1. Arming terrorist factions: The trafficking of weapons throughout Central Asia does not
have as large of an impact as narcotics, but there is still an obvious link between the movement
of smuggled weapons and terrorism. There was previous mention of loose weapons in
Afghanistan and Tajikistan. These caches of weapons were used in wars in each respective
country. Efforts to secure weapons have been positive, but the threat remains as threats like the
IMU continue to regroup. There are concerns over the IMU’s resurgence and potential vast
acquisition of trafficked weapons. Experts fear that weapons trafficking will increase due to
increased demand by terrorist elements. Analysts claim that criminal organizations are focusing
on the illicit weapons trade due to the possible revenues.29
2. Narcotics funding Terror: The massive amount of money exchanged in the illicit
trafficking provided many within the trade with financial support. These funds have also
historically supported terror groups. Following the end of the cold war, many groups that
received state funding for opposing or supporting communism were left to fend for themselves.
This contributed to the growth of narcotics trafficking as a means of support for these groups.
Global reaction to the events of September 11th was to deter the financial support of extremist
groups. This new reality further entrenched the necessity to secure funds via narcotics
trafficking. Evidence shows that terror movements globally are embracing criminal activity to
function with drugs being the primary means. The financial support these groups are able to
accrue undermine the security structure of the region, but the direct impact of narcotic abuse also
furthers their goal. I previously mentioned an increase in crime as being a side-effect of the drug
trade. Decrease in economic production is another consequence of this.30
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The more immediate threat to the states of Central Asia appears to be the resurgence of
the IMU. Earlier I stated the potential threat of the IMU if they are able to rearm and assert their
influence in the region, particularly Fergana. To obtain these objectives the IMU would have to
financially support itself to acquire more weapons and grow its base. When the IMU was driven
into Afghanistan, the Taliban provided it with a safe haven and allowed the group to financially
support itself through narcotics trafficking.31 The idea of this militant group building itself up
through drug funds is not new and it should be concerning that the group already has experience
in this area. The success of Afghani producers in exporting opium also points to their success in
exporting the ideology of militant Islam. The militant group Hezb-i-Islami used funds from
trafficking to support militants in Uzbekistan. Islamic militants were responsible for the 2004
attacks in Tashkent, an area of Uzbekistan near the Kazakh border.32 It is clear that the reentry of
the IMU and groups of the same cloth into the narcotics trade would strengthen their attempts to
impose their will on the Fergana Valley. The Fergana Valley is by no coincidence a major transit
point for narcotics entering Central Asia.
B. Drug Routes
Various drug routes connect the producers in Afghanistan to the large consumer base in
Europe. These routes leading to Europe leave plenty of narcotics in Kazakhstan and Russia. The
transit route of Osh in the Fergana Valley is important due to the interplay of narcotics and
terrorism, especially with the return of the IMU. The Balkan route was the prominent route for
narcotics, but the Central Asian route has gained in prominence over the last decade.
1. Osh: Osh, Kyrgyzstan is a city located in the Fergana Valley. The city is referred to as
the drug capital of the region and with good reason. Osh is located on one of the most significant
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trafficking routes that connects Afghanistan with Central Asia, Russia and Europe. One of the
main reasons this location is so significant to the drug trade is the shared border with Tajikistan.
The border is inadequately administered which allows for trafficking to thrive. Narcotics come
from Afghanistan travel to Tajikistan onto Osh. The narcotics continue on to the Kyrgyz capital
of Bishek before reaching Kazakhstan where the product will go to Russia or remain in
Kazakhstan as exhibited in appendix B6.33
2. Balkan route vs. Silk Road: Narcotics trafficked from Afghanistan primarily travelled
through Iran and Pakistan to reach the western market prior to the turn of the century. This trend
changed during the early 2000s for a few reasons. The border Afghanistan shared with Central
Asia became more permeable.34 Iran embarked on a more concerted effort to stop the flow of
drugs from neighboring Afghanistan. Iran had already been involved in endeavors to repel
Afghani drugs entering their country in the two previous decades.35 The two prominent routes
from Afghanistan are the Balkan route and the Silk Road route through Central Asia. Despite
crackdowns the Balkan route makes its way through Iran and Turkey and reaching Hungary
where it is introduced to the European market, these routes can be seen in the map located in
appendix B9. The Central Asian route makes its way to Russia and some of those routes from
that system also converge in Hungary.36 There have been several estimates on the percentage of
narcotics from Afghanistan being trafficked via the Central Asia route. The estimates range from
25 to 75 percent. Significance of this route cannot be understated regardless of the exact
percentage.
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V. Conclusion
As this chapter comes to a close, it is important to restate the major challenges trafficking
poses to the region. Combatting these issues is a complicated matter and some appear deeply
ingrained in the structure of Central Asia.
A. Challenges
The challenges Central Asia must deal with in regards to trafficking will continue to exist
in the short term and likely will continue on beyond that. These issues include institutional
corruption, a challenge that undermines the roles of enforcement efforts and will be a complex
issue to deal with going forward. The threat of terror will remain as long as the funding of terror
groups through narcotics continues. Pressures from the United States on Central Asian
governments to continue anti-narcotic operations will certainly have an impact, but the genuine
bearing of this pressure can be diluted by artificial seizures aimed at appeasing the international
community and maintaining quotas.
1. Corruption: The influence trafficking has on corruption is vast and in many cases hard
to identify. The financial incentive of involving oneself in the drug trade is many times too good
to turn down for Central Asian officials. Police, customs and border agents have been
compromised throughout the region. Corruption is not limited to lower level officials, and a
hierarchy has developed. Government officials at varying levels also engage in the illicit trade as
was the case in Kazakhstan when a Tajik ambassador was caught with a supply of heroin is his
car.37 Not only will there be the challenge of hindering the financial appeal, but also to combat
the culture of corruption that has permeated multiple regional institutions. Combatting corruption
brings up a conflict of interests in an interesting way. The funds generated by bribery and
corruption are in some cases integral to maintaining a livable wage for enforcement officials.
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Taking away that income could financially cripple some who relied on the illicit income and
further promote underground illicit activity. Here we are getting ahead of ourselves because it
would take quite an effort to effectively diminish corruption. This is especially telling when
considering the artificial seizures and arrests that are conducted to meet quotas.
2. Terror: The financial impact trafficking has on terrorism is another massive challenge
that the Kazakh government will have to overcome. Groups like HT generally derive their
income from legitimate international donations. The IMU on the other hand has historically
prospered from the sale of narcotics and have been able to arm themselves via weapons
trafficking. The resurgence of this group is concerning to regional analysts as their eyes set upon
the Fergana Valley. Located along a prominent trafficking route, the Fergana Valley would
prove a strategic point for terrorist organizations and government officials alike.
3. U.S. influence: Economic and security interests in Central Asia are primary reasons for
U.S. involvement in the region. The U.S. has been particularly active in the area of
counternarcotic measures. A branch of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) was opened in
Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The U.S. also placed a narcotics officer in the U.S. Embassy in
Kazakhstan to manage counternarcotic operations for the entire region. Narcotics seizures on
Central Asian borders increased as a result of U.S. involvement, but skepticism remains. One
argument attributes the increase in seizures to the overall increase of opium production.38 U.S.
perspectives recognize the linkage between international terror and narcotics trafficking and
continued efforts in the region may increase the amount of drugs captured, but they must
increase pressure on the institutions they have funded.
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B. Closing argument
The issue of trafficking in Central Asia is important due to the security implications.
Loose weapons aided the insurgencies in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Narcotics trafficking also
generates negative consequences. The assertion that terror is funded by narcotic sales is well
supported. Other societal concerns arise from the trade, these include, domestic violence,
HIV/AIDS influx and other drug related crime. International funds to counter trafficking aided in
increasing arrests and seizures, but an increase in narcotic production undermines this success.
One of the hardest challenges Kazakhstan, Central Asia and international powers face is dealing
with the culture of corruption. States may need to give their enforcement officials better wages to
curb the influence of illicit money. The problem is that some states do not have the financial
standing that a country like Kazakhstan has. Instability in Afghanistan is the key contributor to
the success of trafficking through Central Asia and securing the border Afghanistan shares with
Central Asia should also be prioritized.
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Chapter IV: Kazakhstan’s Border Concerns
I. Introduction
Kazakhstan like all states, faces a multitude of challenges in maintaining their security.
These challenges include the rise of militant Islam within Central Asia, particularly in the
Fergana Valley. Arms and narcotics trafficking provide another concern for Kazakhstan. The
linkage between trafficking and terrorism highlights the threat to security. Both of these concerns
share a commonality. Trafficking and the threat of militancy mutually expose weaknesses in the
area of border security. Kazakhstan shares borders with various countries and this makes issues
such as border demarcation integral. The diversity of the states Kazakhstan shares borders with
provides varying challenges for the country. The concerns between the Kazakh-Chinese border
differ from the issues Kazakhstan must tackle on its southern border. Demarcation of territory,
ethnic tension, and oil production are just a few concerns Kazakhstan must address to further
their security and economic efforts.
A. Demarcation of territory
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan was put in control of a
massive territory. Demarcation of this vast territory has continued in the two decades following
independence. Demarcation is an issue that Kazakhstan has had to address with each of its
neighbors. One of the primary issues concerning demarcation is the ethnic dimension. States
must work in concord to delimit territory and in some cases this may leave members of an ethnic
group under the territorial rule of a government different than the one they identify with.
B. Border Security structure
The chapter on Arms and Narcotics trafficking demonstrates the need for Kazakhstan to
be able to patrol its border in an effective manner. Kazakhstan must work in conjunction with
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neighboring states to curtail the illegal movement of drugs, weapons and people. I will analyze
the effectiveness of Kazakhstan’s border security along various fronts and exhibit the overall
state of the effort.
C. Ethnic Tensions
Ethnic tensions from within and outside of Kazakhstan vary. It is important to
differentiate the role ethnicity plays in the context of the southern border with Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan as opposed to the border with China and Russia. All borders
provide different challenges with different ethnicities taking part. This does not always result in
conflict however and it is necessary to examine the harmonious relationships as well.
Kazakhstan’s internal diversity also provides another dimension to this argument.
D. Oil and pipelines
Kazakhstan’s holdings of oil and gas make the country an interest to various regional
powers including Russia and China. The presence of oil in the Caspian Sea is a key asset that
other states seek to benefit from. The map in appendix B10 shows the resource riches of the
Caspian Sea. The regional relationships forged within the area of oil and gas and the future
prospects of this industry will be examined. The residual effects of these pipelines and forged
relationships will also be analyzed more thoroughly later in the chapter.
II. Demarcation
Demarcation is the process in which states mark the boundaries between one another.
Kazakhstan inherited the responsibility of demarcating its territory with the demise of the Soviet
Union. Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan became independent states with their own
sovereign territories bordering Kazakhstan. The eastern portion of independent Kazakhstan
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bordered global power China. Russia was no longer the center of a common territory, but a
northern neighbor with an expansive shared border.
A. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan
The borders Kazakhstan shares with the southern neighbors are likely the most
concerning to security officials. This reputation is due in large part to a past of ethnic violence,
the transit of illegal weapons and narcotics originating from Afghanistan. The threat of terrorism
is also a significant factor. The role Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan played in the rise of terror within
the region and trafficking of narcotics were described in the previous chapter. Turkmenistan is
less of a threat in these areas, but the country provides its own challenges to Kazakhstan.
1. Uzbekistan: Border demarcation between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan has been the
most difficult of the southern neighbors. This period of demarcation has been marred by episodes
of violence following Uzbek efforts to strengthen border security. The reason behind the Uzbek
initiative was a wave of attacks by Islamists in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan began
working in disputed areas with Kazakhstan in winter 2000. This resulted in acts of violence
against Kazakh citizens. From 2000 to 2004, approximately 20 acts of violence occurred in
oblasts in southern Kazakhstan. Four of these attacks resulted in the death of Kazakh citizens.1
Demarcation efforts with Uzbekistan were met with protests in 2006. The inhabitants of the
Shardara district impeded the demarcation efforts by physically blocking administrators from
erecting boundary posts. The protest stemmed from the Kazakh population of 500 living on
5,400 hectares that were to be granted to Uzbekistan without consult of local officials.2 The
negotiation facet of delimitation between the two countries concluded in September 2002. The
efforts of actually demarcating the territory entered the closing stages in spring of 2010.
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Kazakhstan’s ambassador to Uzbekistan praises the harmonious relationship the countries are
currently engaged in and cites the demarcation as a tool to increase the security and overall
stability of Central Asia.3
2. Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan: Kazakhstan’s delineation of borders with Turkmenistan
and Kyrgyzstan proved less arduous and violent than the process was with Uzbekistan. The
delimitation process with Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan were both completed in 2001.4
Turkmenistan’s delimitation was signed by both presidents in Astana in June of 2001 and the
treaty was ratified in 2003. At this point, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan had not finished
delimitation of the Caspian Sea, the subject of Caspian delimitation will be examined later.
Kazakh and Kyrgyz delimitation went just as smoothly with only a hindrance in the drafting of
the treaty in 2002 by Kyrgyz officials claiming Kyrgyzstan was losing vital areas. 5 As of
November 2012, the Chairman of the State Agency for Land Resources Management Kadirkhan
Otarov stated Kazakhstan’s intent to finish the demarcation of the border with Kyrgyzstan in
2013. According to Otarav, the field work has been finalized with only paperwork to be
completed in 2013. The chairman also stated the field work for the demarcation of borders with
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are in the final stages.6
B. China and Russia
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan inherited a border responsibility
with China. Some territorial disputes on this border stemmed from the legacy of Soviet-Chinese
relations in the 19th and 20th century. Kazakhstan would also have to reformat borders with
Russia.
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1. China: China made claims to disputed territory where the Soviet frontier guards
allegedly changed demarcation posts in the 1920s. Border threats from China are the perceived
reason for the transfer of the capitol from Almaty to Astana.7 The states of the former Soviet
Union were left with 25 disputed areas with China. Kazakhstan inherited two of these areas. This
process was not finished as easily as the delineation of Kazakhstan’s southern border with
Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. Negotiations between the states occurred monthly for
approximately three years. The use of historical documents aided in the compromise and China
accepted the terms which granted them 47 percent of the disputed areas.8 The issue of
demarcation proved to be an impetus for greater coordination between the two states. Trade talks
accompanied the signatures of finalizing demarcation documents in May 2002. Kazakhstan had a
vested interest in maintaining the volume of steel it supplied China and aimed to provide 1.5
million tonnes to China for the following year.9 China and Kazakhstan would make further
agreements regarding trade, particularly in the area of natural resources. In December 2006,
Kazakhstan and China signed the “21st century cooperation strategy between the People's
Republic of China and the Republic of Kazakhstan” agreement. This in essence stated the
completion of delimitation of the border, but this agreement also affirmed the coordination of
Chinese and Kazakh policy in issues of security and sovereignty. The two states would increase
military cooperation in terms of border security and combatting terrorism.10 One of the most
interesting aspects of this strengthened relationship was the Kazakh acceptance of China’s “One
China” stance. Kazakhstan recognized China as the legal representation of Taiwan and
maintained this support by opposing the inclusion of Taiwan in international organizations as a
sovereign territory. The relationship between China and Kazakhstan would continue to develop
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as the two states strengthened bilateral negotiations and cooperation between their parliaments
increased.11
2. Russia: Kazakhstan’s shares its largest border with Russia. As of 2009, the two states
were working to begin the demarcation process. A Kazakh-Russian commission reported that the
sides were negotiating the placement of border signs.12 The demarcation of the Russian border is
set to be the most difficult of all states neighboring Kazakhstan. The 7,591 kilometer border is
the largest in the world and the demarcation process is expected to last over a decade. According
to Russia's co-head of the bilateral demarcation commission Vladimir Volkov, the delimitation
process took six years and now they must travel the 7,591 kilometers to place the boundaries.
Volkov also mentioned the financial burden as a further hindrance to the process.13 The process
of demarcation is a lengthy effort and that continues to this day. Demarcation of borders with
neighboring states has been an intensive effort for Kazakhstan, as each state has provides its own
challenges and benefits.
III. Border Security
The process of demarcation can be seen as a facet of border security. States delineate
their borders in order to maintain the sovereignty of their territory and counter any threats.
Different states provide different threats to Kazakhstan. Conflict, terror, illegal migration and
trafficking are primary border concerns to Kazakhstan and other regional players. It is important
to gauge the threat that each border poses and to understand the areas in which state
collaboration has been successful.
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A. Illegal Migration & Smuggling
The issue of illegal migration throughout Central Asia is largely tied to security concerns.
The threat of militancy and extremism is tied to the illegal movement of people across borders,
this idea is emphasized when narcotics and arms trafficking is taken into account. These groups
and goods make their way through the various states of Central Asia and can enter the EU,
Russia and China. There are multiple reasons for illegal migration. Some do so to implement
ideologies that seek to undermine and ultimately harm the state, others are simply due to
financial concerns. Smuggling is also another means in which revenues are earned. This can have
a negative effect on the security of the state by aiding anti-government groups and undermining
state industries.
1. Economic migrants: Many Central Asians are forced to migrate in order to ensure
some semblance of financial stability that their home country cannot provide. Kazakhstan is
particularly vulnerable to this form of migration for multiple reasons. Kazakhstan is the most
prosperous Central Asian nation and this attracts laborers from throughout the region. For
example, the promise of higher revenues has spurred thousands of Uzbeks to enter the
neighboring region of southern Kazakhstan in search of work. Turkmens also enter Kazakhstan
looking for employment opportunities via the Mangistau province bordering the Caspian Sea.14
This concept is vaguely similar to the migration of workers from Central America and Mexico to
the United States. The majority of those that make illegal crossings into Kazakhstan do so in
search of labor and while many seek Russia and the EU as a final destination, several stay in
Kazakhstan seeking employment. Experts in Kazakhstan claim approximately 50,000 Kyrgyz
illegal migrants have occupations in the Jambyl and Almaty oblasts. This can be attributed to the
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weakness of certain areas of the Kyrgyz-Kazakh border which is accessible by foot, car and
train.15
2. Smuggling: The threat of smuggling in Kazakhstan is inextricably linked to terrorism.
Narcotics trafficking promotes the function of terrorism and extremist ideologies, while arms
trafficking grants them the tools to institute their goals. In many other cases smuggling is a
means in which some populations obtain their income; this is usually small-scale smuggling
along border areas.16 Although the intentions of these smugglers are generally less sinister than
that of the larger criminal networks and militant groups of the region, the results of smuggling
are still the same. Increased trafficking of weapons puts arms in the possession of those that may
seek to undermine regional enforcement. Narcotics sales may benefit the small time dealer or
smuggler, but the drugs like heroin pose great health and safety risks as explained in the previous
chapter. Oil has also been subject to such illicit activity. In the western oil producing Kazakh
region of Aktyubinsk, reports of oil smuggling have emerged. 10 investigated cases from
February to April 2009 concluded that the illegally smuggled oil cost approximately $4.6
million.17
B. Countermeasures
Kazakhstan with the help of many regional players and even the United States is
responding to border threats. Kazakhstan is seen as an indispensable part in maintaining Central
Asian security. Security implications affect the frontiers of China and Russia as well as the
interests of the United States. Relationships with these states reinforces Kazakhstan’s security
capabilities.
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1. Kazakhstan: In 1996, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan as well as China and Russia
sought to strengthen border confidence between each other. After establishing themselves as the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the members pledged to limit military actions across
their mutual borders, this limited military maneuvering and required states to notify neighbors of
any military action within 100 kilometers of the border.18 Mutual respect on border issues
increases through agreements like this, but many times threats to regional borders are caused by
non-state actors. While states should always have the ability to protect themselves from the
encroachment of other states, Central Asia powers must be able to ward of the emerging threat of
non-state actors. Kazakhstan has previously proven its ability to shut down its borders in the
midst of security threats. One of the more recent events involves the Kazakh response following
an attack within its territory. The terrorist attack took place in Taraz in November 2011 when a
34 year old man accused of robbing a gun store killed 5 law enforcement officials and 2
civilians. The man then detonated a bomb that killed himself and injured other members of
enforcement following his arrest. The Kazakh government responded by tightening security on
the Kazakh-Kyrgyz border with increased numbers of border troops being sent to the frontier.19
The group known as Jund al Khilafah claimed responsibility for the attack and a previous string
of bomb attacks in Atyrau near the Caspian Sea. These additional attacks only resulted in the
death of the bomber. The Kazakh government stated the group had come into being only recently
and claims Kazakhstan can be a safe haven for radicals from Afghanistan despite the relative
lack of attacks in the country.20 The response by the government emphasizes the threat
emanating from Kazakhstan’s southern neighbors and the spillover effect of extremism in
Afghanistan. Kazakhstan previously secured the border with Uzbekistan as terrorist activity
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increased. Increases in border security have also been enacted for non-violent threats.
Kazakhstan imposed stricter passport control with the Kyrgyz border in response to an
intensified surge in illegal migration. The border with China was also tightened during the
outbreak of SARS.21 Kazakhstan has shown the capability to defend its border from various
threats. Although there have been a few instances of terror and trafficking still presents a
problem, Kazakhstan remains a symbol of stability for the region. The neighboring countries in
Central Asia do not have the same financial clout and overall stature to effectively repel threats
without cooperation. That is why organizations like the CSTO and CIS are vital to the
maintenance of regional borders.
2. Central Asia and Russia: Central Asian states have cooperated in combatting various
border threats. One of the channels in which Central Asian states coordinates security efforts is
the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). CSTO chairman Victor Ivanov stated the
importance of a recent anti-drug exercise. These tactical exercises were aimed at combatting the
armed traffickers emanating from northern Afghanistan.22 The CSTO is proving to be an
effective means in which the Russian and the Central Asian states bolster the security measures
of the region. This is especially crucial when considering the current state of Tajikistan.
Tajikistan borders Afghanistan and the two states share a 1,300 kilometer border. I have
previously discussed the actual and potential threats emanating from Afghanistan and how they
undermine the security of Central Asian states. The threat of narcotics trafficking, arms
smuggling and terrorism are the main issues plaguing this border and if unchecked the results
can prove disastrous for all involved in the region. The president of Tajikistan has recently stated
his desire for assistance from fellow members of the CSTO to secure the border with
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Afghanistan. President Rakhmon claims the terrorist threat from Afghanistan is increasing and
made an official plea in September 2013.23 This recent admission emphasizes the need for
Central Asian states to continue strengthening of their borders collectively. Combatting terror in
Central Asia is an ongoing battle and financial support as well as interstate collaboration is a
vital tool. Russia and the CSTO responded to Rakhmon’s request with these thoughts in mind.
Putin has affirmed that the CSTO has agreed to a draft that would provide support to the Tajik
border by granting the country arms and military hardware at no cost. The international troop
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 is a significant facet of this commitment as many expect
the activity of terror organizations and narcotics trafficking to increase as international forces
leave the country.24 The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) also promotes military
efficacy and exhibited a special anti-terror exercise that took place in Kyrgyzstan in late
September 2013. The exercise simulated an assault on an imaginary opponent as the Russian Air
Force utilized Sukhoi-25 jets and MI-8 helicopters assisted ground troops.25 All of the
aforementioned events point to a concerted effort by Central Asian states in conjunction with
Russia to facilitate regional border forces through financial and technical support. Yet is
important to understand that Russia does not have a monopoly on Central Asian security and
powers like the United States and China have a significant influence.
3. China: China has historically been interested in maintaining a secure western border.
The emergence of Kazakhstan as an independent state gave the Chinese a new government to
work with for better or worse. China’s relationship with Kazakhstan has been amicable since
demarcation processes were arranged. Closer relations have been formed and Kazakhstan has
accepted China’s controversial “One China” policy. The SCO is another channel where China
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can express concerns to Central Asia and Russia. Oil distribution and the Uighur population are
some of the main concerns for China and both will be detailed further in the chapter.
4. The United States: The relationship between the United States and Kazakhstan
developed following the peaceful dismantling of Kazakhstan’s Soviet era nuclear arsenal.26
Following the events of September 11th, the United States intensified relations with Kazakhstan
and Central Asia in large. During the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan was a
strategic launching point for American forces. Consequentially, Uzbekistan became subject to
increased terror threats.27 Kazakhstan proved to be a more favorable ally to the United States as
it was more stable and financially sound than Uzbekistan. Several military agreements were
signed between Kazakhstan and the U.S., the stipulations of these agreements aided the
capability of Kazakh border security. The two states worked in conjunction to cultivate a
helicopter force and invested in improvements for the Naval Academy in Aktau located on the
Caspian Sea. The improvements were made to help Kazakh forces battle against narcotic
smuggling and engage in counterterrorism efforts. The U.S. also provided support to Kazakh
border protection services through the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS). The
EXBS supplied Kazakhstan’s Maritime Border Guard with quick response speedboats that would
be used to patrol the Caspian Sea.28
IV. Ethnic Tensions
The ethnic makeup of Central Asia is far from homogenous. Various ethnicities exist in
the region and this can lead to collaboration and sometimes conflict. Different states have
different issues regarding ethnicity. Many of these situations are due to the proximity with other
states and the migration illegal and legal of multiple groups.
91

A. Fergana Valley and the Chinese Uighur issue
The issue of ethnic conflict has been particularly potent in Central Asia’s southern region.
The Fergana Valley is one of the prominent areas for ethnic conflict. This usually involves the
Uzbek and Kyrgyz populations. Another issue has been the diaspora of Chinese Uighurs
throughout Central Asia. Chinese interest in the Uighur population is based on the threat of
separatism and terrorism.
1. Fergana: The interaction of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the Fergana Valley in the
recent past has been typified by the conflict between the ethnic groups. Conflict between Kyrgyz
and Uzbeks over land disputes in 1990 left hundreds dead.29 Ethnic conflict occurred in the
southern city of Osh in 2010. Mayor Myrzakmatov blamed the conflict on Uzbek separatists for
stoking ethnic fervor.30 Another issue in the Kyrgyz-Uzbek narrative is the Shohimardon
initiative introduced by Kyrgyzstan over the ownership of the resort zone. This debate has
intensified ethnic tension and ethnic conflict is more likely to occur.31 The larger impact of
tensions like these is the destabilizing influence on Central Asia. Forces needed to control
borders and quell the spread of terror and trafficking are being tied up in containing ethnic
clashes.
2. Uighurs: The diaspora of Uighurs in Kazakhstan is an important issue for China. The
concerns for China are based on Uighur separatism threats. The reality of the Uighur population
in Kazakhstan is not so sinister. For the most part interethnic peace has been maintained between
the local Kazakhs and Uighur population. Uighurs are considered significant contributors to
Kazakh society and culture.32 Uighurs in Kazakhstan challenged the Chinese government’s
perception of the group as aligned with terrorism. Following the events of September 11th, the
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Movement for Kazakhstan's Future and young Uighurs initiated the “Young Uighurs against
Terrorism” program which condemned the actions of terrorists and seeks to separate the actions
of individuals from the perceptions of the entire ethnic group.33 One theory argues that China
does not accept the Uighur population because of their religious beliefs are not compatible with
the largely homogenous Han Chinese population. This hinders Chinese attempts to assimilate the
Uighur population and thus stokes their concerns about separatism and terrorism.34 A glance of
the life of Uighurs in Kazakhstan can be seen in appendix A7. Aside from minor skirmishes in
Kazakhstan, the Uighur population appears to not pose a significant threat to Kazakh security.
V. Kazakh Oil and Gas possessions
An endowment of natural resources has provided the foundation for Kazakhstan’s
financial success. Relationships with various states have been formed due to these holdings.
Relationships with Russia and China are strengthened through the export of energy resources and
this further entrenches Kazakhstan as a regional power. With the resources located in the
Caspian Sea delimitation is necessary.
A. The Caspian Sea
The Caspian Sea is a strategic point for all states bordering the sea. This includes Russia,
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Iran. The presence of multiple states vying for
resources makes security in this region a priority.
1. Militarization of the Caspian: The strategic value of the Caspian cannot be understated.
It is the largest inland body of water and Kazakhstan maintains the largest holdings of oil in the
northern region of the sea.35 The importance of these reserves is emphasized by the militarization
of the region. The U.S. supplied Kazakhstan boats to patrol the Caspian via the EXBS program.
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Kazakhstan’s desire to modernize their naval force was another opportunity for the U.S. to
further aid their interests in the Caspian Sea by supporting the effort. Support and training of
local armed and patrol forces affirmed their position. American support in boosting defense
undermined Caspian states reliance on Russia for military support, although Russia still remains
heavily involved.
2. Iran: The presence of Iran also contributed to the militarization of the Caspian. States
neighboring the country were concerned that Iran would threaten their reserves. One indication
of Iran’s intentions is in their belief of returning the oil holdings to original divisions proposed
by treaties between the USSR and Iran in 1921 and 1940. These treaties would grant Iran and
Russia 20 percent of the Caspian each.36
B. Oil and Gas
Kazakhstan’s resource possessions makes the security of its oil producing regions vital to
the country’s financial health. Other countries such as China and Russia are dependent on
Kazakh resources. The Natural gas and oil holdings of Kazakhstan and other Caspian states can
be seen in appendix C5 and C6.
1. China: China’s has been active in securing resources from neighboring Kazakhstan.
With bonds between the countries much stronger since demarcation, the two have been in a
positive economic relationship. In 2005, the China National Petroleum Corporation purchased
PetroKazakhstan for $4.18 billion. This purchase was followed by a $700 million investment in a
pipeline that would transport oil to China. China sought to establish a stable flow of oil and gas
while reducing their dependence on Middle Eastern oil.37 In May of 2013, the two states agreed
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on a bill that would increase the output of the current pipeline. Output would increase by 25
billion cubic meters of gas per year.38
2. Russia: Russia is in an interesting position in terms of resources reserves. The country
is able to supply its population through its energy monopoly Gazprom. Russia needed to
establish a pipeline with Caspian states to ensure their export demands for European states. This
was achieved in 2007, when Russia signed an agreement with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to
build a natural gas pipeline.39 European markets would be appeased and Russia would
importantly maintain their energy monopoly over the region. Both the EU and the U.S. have
been interested in establishing pipelines from the Caspian. The U.S. wanted to establish a
pipeline under the Caspian Sea that would bypass Russia and Iran. The European Union also
sought a pipeline that would transport gas to Austria.40
VI. Conclusion
The overall issues of border security in Central Asia have varied. Demarcation, illegal
migration, trafficking, terror and weakness in border security have provided Central Asian
governments with plenty to tackle. Kazakhstan’s oil reserves in the Caspian Sea have contributed
to the financial strength of the country through relations with states like China and Russia, but an
era of militarization was needed to support the defense of this region. Demarcation processes are
still ongoing throughout Kazakhstan’s borders. The border with Russia is not expected to be
finished for over a decade. China and Kazakhstan’s relationship prospered following their
demarcation efforts. Efforts in the south were relatively easy except for demarcation with
Uzbekistan which resulted in ethnic violence. The growth of illegal migration poses a threat to
Central Asia. Kazakhstan is overwhelmingly subject to illegal migration. Migrants travel to
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Kazakhstan in search of higher wages or in route to Russia and the EU. Kazakhstan in
conjunction with the U.S., Russia, China and other Central Asian states has engaged of exercises
to counter border threats. Training, financial support and equipment endowments have been used
to hinder the threat of smuggling, protect the Caspian and combat terrorist threats. Continued
efforts to solve these issues within the CSTO and other international relationships will prove
vital as Kazakhstan strives to increase border security and diminish regional threats.

Golunov, Sergey V., and Roger N. McDermott. “Border Security in Kazakhstan: Threats, Policies and Future
Challenges.” Journal Of Slavic Military Studies 18, no. 1 (March 2005): 38-39.
2
“Kazakh-Uzbek Border Demarcation Meets Local Protests.” BBC Monitoring Central Asia, Jun 20, 2006.
3
Interfax. “Demarcation of Kazakh-Uzbek border enters final stage.”Central Asia Business News, March 10, 2010:
4
Golunov, Sergey V., and Roger N. McDermott. “Border Security in Kazakhstan: Threats, Policies and Future
Challenges.” Journal Of Slavic Military Studies 18, no. 1 (March 2005): 39
5
Ibid
6
Interfax. “Kazakhstan to finish delimiting border with Kyrgyzstan in 2013 - Land Resources Agency.” Central
Asia General Newswire, November 06, 2012: 1
7
Golunov, Sergey V., and Roger N. McDermott. “Border Security in Kazakhstan: Threats, Policies and Future
Challenges.” Journal Of Slavic Military Studies 18, no. 1 (March 2005): 37
8
“Kazakh Official Details Border Demarcation with China, Uzbekistan.” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, Jul 22,
2005.
9
“Kazakhstan, China to Sign Final Border Accord during Minister's Visit.” BBC Monitoring Central Asia, May 06,
2002.
10
“China, Kazakhstan Complete Border Demarcation.” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, Dec 20, 2006.
11
Ibid: 1
12
“Border; Russia, Kazakhstan Reach Agreement on Beginning of State Border Demarcation.” Interfax : Russia &
CIS Military Information Weekly, Mar 27, 2009.
13
“Border; Demarcation of Russian-Kazakh Border to Continue for 10-15 Years - Diplomat.” Interfax : Russia &
CIS Military Information Weekly, May 29, 2009.
14
Golunov, Sergey V., and Roger N. McDermott. “Border Security in Kazakhstan: Threats, Policies and Future
Challenges.” Journal Of Slavic Military Studies 18, no. 1 (March 2005): 42
15
Ibid Golunov 42
16
Ibid Golunov 43
17
“Oil Smuggling Cases Uncovered in Kazakh West.” BBC Monitoring Central Asia, Jan 10, 2009.
18
Legvold, Robert., & American Academy of Arts and Sciences. “Thinking strategically: The major powers,
Kazakhstan, and the central Asian nexus.” Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Sciences. (2003). 131
19
Interfax. “Kazakhstan tightens security on border with Kyrgyzstan after Taraz attack.” Central Asia Business
News, November 13, 2011: 1.
20
“Eight Dead in Kazakhstan Terror Attack.” McClatchy - Tribune Business News, Nov 12, 2011.
1

96

Golunov, Sergey V., and Roger N. McDermott. “Border Security in Kazakhstan: Threats, Policies and Future
Challenges.” Journal Of Slavic Military Studies 18, no. 1 (March 2005): 46
22
“CIS security bloc official says drills necessary to fight Afghan drug smuggling.” BBC Monitoring International
Reports. (September 20,2013).
21

“Russian-led bloc to help Tajikistan reinforce its border with Afghanistan.” Times of Central Asia. September 28,
2013
24
Ibid
25
“CIS anti-terrorist units start exercise in Kyrgyzstan.” Philippines News Agency. September 26, 2013
26
Blackmon, Pamela. “In the Shadow of Russia: Reform in Kazakahstan and Uzbekistan.” East Lansing. Michigan
State University Press (2011): 50
27
Legvold, Robert., & American Academy of Arts and Sciences. “Thinking strategically: The major powers,
Kazakhstan, and the central Asian nexus.” Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Sciences (2003). 64
28
McDermott, Roger N. “United States and NATO Military Cooperation with Kazakhstan: The Need for a New
Approach,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 21 Issue 4, October 2008. 618-621
29
Rubin, Barnett. “Central Asia and Central Africa: Transnational Wars and Ethnic Conflicts.” Journal Of Human
Development 7, no. 1 (March 2006): 10
30
“Kyrgyz Mayor Blames Uzbek Separatists, some Officials for Ethnic Unrest.” BBC Monitoring Central Asia,
May 11, 2011.
31
“Kyrgyz-Uzbek Border Disputes might Cause Ethnic Clashes - Kazakh Report.” BBC Monitoring Central Asia,
Nov 06, 2004.
32
“Kazakhstan's Uighur Leader Praises State Policy on Minorities.” BBC Monitoring Central Asia, Nov 29, 2005.
33
“Young Uighurs Condemn Terrorism in Protest in Kazakh Southern Capital.” BBC Monitoring Central Asia, Oct
04, 2001.
34
“Uighurs Working to Prevent China Unrest from Spreading to Kazakhstan - Paper.” BBC Monitoring Central
Asia, Aug 04, 2009.
35
Aghai-Diba, Bahman “The Law & Politics of the Caspian Sea in the Twenty-First Century: The Positions and
Views of Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, With Special Reference to Iran,” Ibex Pub January 1, 2003
11-48
36
Ibid Aghai-Diba 81-82
37
Pala, Christopher. “China Pays Dearly for Kazakhstan Oil.” New York Times, Mar 17, 2006.
38
Mukhtarov, D. “Kazakhstan-China Gas Pipeline Capacity to be Increased.” McClatchy - Tribune Business News,
May 31, 2013.
39
Dempsey, Judy. “Russia Signs Deal for Gas Pipeline Along Caspian Sea.” New York Times. Dec 21, 2007.
40
Ibid Dempsey
23

97

Chapter V: Multilevel Analysis of Kazakhstan’s Challenges
I. Introduction
Kazakhstan, like all countries in the region face the threat of various challenges ranging
from terrorism and extremism to narcotics/arms trafficking and a burgeoning culture of
corruption. I previously examined the general impact of these challenges and will now consider
them within the context of global, regional, state and individual levels of analysis. Each
challenge is dealt with differently according to the various levels and it is important to make
these distinctions as well as elucidate the successes and failures of each level.
A. Extremism and Terrorism
I shall begin with the subject of my first content chapter and analyze the levels in which
terrorism is dealt with in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. I will look into the global response to
demonstrate what players are involved with extremism and terror within the context of the global
war on terror. Regional cooperation will also be analyzed with an emphasis on the relationships
between the Central Asian states as well as anti-terror efforts between Kazakhstan and regional
powers like Russia and China. The response of the state must be critiqued as we try to
understand the domestic reaction to the growth of extremist thought and terrorist attacks within
the region and within Kazakhstan which until recently has been shielded from these attacks.
Individual motivations within the context of terrorism will also be analyzed.
B. Trafficking
The presence of trafficking within Central Asia is significant due to geographical
location, massive monetary incentive and the linkage with terrorism. It is important to
understand if there are any discernible differences between arms and narcotics trafficking
amongst the varying levels. The response of organizations such as the United Nations and others
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will elucidate the global reaction to trafficking within Central Asia. Russia and Kazakhstan’s role
as gateways to Western European markets make the analysis of reactions of administrations in
Kazakhstan, Russia and Europe pertinent. With narcotics primarily flowing from Afghanistan via
Kazakhstan’s southern neighbors, Kazakhstan must deal with trafficking in a regional sense with
these countries. At the same time Kazakhstan works to enhance domestic security as to hinder
the flow of weapons and narcotics. The last level of analysis for this topic is the individual level.
I will attempt to shed light on the incentives for individuals to take part in or condone the
perpetuation of trafficking within Central Asia. The role of the state is important here as well
because questions must be asked as to what methods are employed to hinder or incentivize
against civilian involvement in regional and domestic trafficking.
C. Kazakhstan’s Border Issues
The final chapter analyzed tackles the issues of border threats to Kazakhstan. This is
largely based on regional cooperation and conflict, but the other levels of analysis will be
employed to explain the impact of issues such as corruption, ethnic tensions and oil. The
structure of border security will also be analyzed with an emphasis on corruption and
institutional efficiency. This analysis contributes to the greater argument at hand; Kazakhstan is
of upmost importance to global efforts of increasing security and financial growth. The solution
to many of the issues facing Kazakhstan will contribute to further regional and in turn global
stability.
II. Analyzing Extremism and Terrorism
A multilevel analysis of terrorism and extremism within Central Asia requires
explanations of the role of various groups and actors. For example, when looking at the global
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aspect one must question the role global terror networks play as well as the response from
organizations like the United Nations. It is important to learn the extent in which these two
forces combat each other in the context of the global war on terror. I also aim to explain the
challenge of combatting terror and extremism on the regional level, while understanding the
relationships spawned between regional powers in the quest to hinder terror within the region.
One must also understand the state response to terrorism and suspected terror groups. This is
especially relevant when considering the crackdown on extremist groups that are non-violent
simply because of the potential for militancy to grow. This potential militancy can actually result
from state treatment. Individual actors are also relevant because in some cases they may commit
acts alone, but are generally influenced by a specific ideology or aided by a particular group.
A. Global Response to Terror and Extremism
Following the events of September 11th, the global response to terrorism intensified
drastically. Terrorism poses a threat to global political and economic stability and the
phenomenon is not limited to any one region. With that said, it is important to note the rise of
extremism and terrorist activity within Central Asia. My analysis of the global response to
terrorism will take into account the actions of prominent international organizations and nonregional global powers such as the United States and Europe.
1. United States response to terrorism: The United States, as many will acknowledge, is
spearheading the global effort against terrorism. The reality that the United States could suffer an
attack of such proportions from a non-state actor certainly intensified efforts of increasing
security both domestically and on an international scale. While the U.S. engaged in controversial
activity to maintain security at home, military and security contingents were deployed to attack
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hubs of terrorist activity. The United States’ desire to carry out a military engagement in Iraq
initially ostracized many allies, with countries including France and Britain unsure of the
proposed action. France also wanted to avoid any internal backlash due to their large population
of Muslims, which is the highest in Europe. Britain eventually became the main ally to the U.S.
in the war on terror and other hesitant states followed suit, including Germany who
overwhelming showed solidarity with the American government following revelations that
terrorists were working in Hamburg.1
2. European response: Many prominent European states showed solidarity with the
United States following September 11th and committed to the global ‘war on terror.’ One
commonality the European powers shared was existence of sizable Muslim populations within
their borders. The vast majority of the religious adherents were peaceful and Britain faced the
task of separating Islam from acts of terrorism. This argument preceded and accompanied the
British commencement of military action in Afghanistan.2 The French response was more
tempered. French citizens felt solidarity with the American catastrophe, but the government
wanted the U.S. to acknowledge French linkage to the Middle East and to not engage in
disproportionate or impetuous military engagements. The French government eventually
provided support, but not without publically stating reservations. Germany also followed suit and
vowed to provide the U.S. forces with military support. This agreement was met with
overwhelming support in the Bundestag.3 The United States enjoyed the support of major
European powers in the global war on terror, including the military engagements in Afghanistan
and Iraq. Yet, the U.S. has developed bilateral relationships with the various Central Asian
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states. Before delving into these relations, I will mention the international response by the United
Nations.
3. The United Nations: The U.N. has been characterized as slow to act and largely
ineffective in their response to international terror. Their categorization of al-Qaeda was deemed
not severe enough, the 1998 embassy bombings certainly changed things. The focus was
squarely affixed on Afghanistan. The importance of Afghanistan within the context of
international terror cannot be understated. We are aware of the presence of terrorist organizations
within the country, but the spillover effect on Central Asia also promotes terror and extremism
within the former Soviet states such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan
and Tajikistan. As the U.S. led coalition brought down the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the
U.N. began its assault on al-Qaeda. In January 2002, the U.N. adopted resolution 1390 that
increased their ability to combat al-Qaeda influence. New more effective flight restrictions were
imposed and financial and arms sanctions were also implemented which stated that all countries
are required to freeze the financial assets and resources of individuals designated as members or
associates of the previously mentioned terror organizations. The implementation of the
resolutions put forth by the U.N. did not help dispel the previous perceptions of ineptitude within
the organization. The two factors that undermined the implementation of resolutions was the fact
that it was not self-executing which meant that the states would ultimately determine if they
wanted to enact these measures. No form of forced compliance existed. Another factor was that
there were no authority institutions within some of the countries to enforce these measures.4 The
U.N. subsequently established the Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and
resolution 1267, which emphasized the policing efforts of the 1390 resolution. The task of the
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CTC was to communicate with countries to criminalize terrorism and financial aid of terror. The
U.N. continued to create resolutions that emphasized the goals of previous resolutions with new
incarnations in 2003 and 2008.5
4. American presence in Central Asia: The American presence in Central Asia, as
previously stated, really came into effect following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Nuclear
disarmament was the main talking point between the U.S. and Kazakhstan, the relationship grew
exponentially from here. Military aid and training was supplied to the Central Asia state, but the
events of September 11th intensified relations between the U.S. and Kazakhstan as well as the
rest of the region. Uzbekistan was a strategic launching point for American forces during the
engagement in Afghanistan. At this point, Uzbekistan was projected to become the main power
in the region, but terrorist threats undermined security and Kazakhstan was recognized as the
major power in the war on terror within the region.6 One must also take into account the borders
Kazakhstan shares with China and Russia when analyzing the U.S. relationship with the country.
As the relationship was established both countries signed several military agreements. Many of
these military agreements included counterterrorism measures. Kazakhstan and the U.S. worked
together to develop a Kazakh helicopter force. Investments were also made in developing the
Kazakhstan’s naval academy.7 American investment has been effective in boosting Kazakh
counterterrorism capability. U.S. efforts in the war on terror have been aided by several
prominent global powers including Germany, Britain and France. The United Nations have been
active in drafting resolutions that would hinder the growth of terror organizations. These
measures have been largely hindered by various factors and this has contributed to the perception
of U.N. ineffectiveness.
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B. Regional Impacts
Much of Central Asia’s issues with terrorism and extremism are due to the shared border
with Afghanistan. Extremist rhetoric is transported beyond borders and in many cases militants
are not far behind. In order to combat the growth of extremist and terrorist activity, Kazakhstan
developed various regional relationships. Regional organizations provide Central Asian states to
cooperate and harmonize methods in the attempt to stop regional terror. Many of the regional
organizations of Central Asia include Russia, China and Balkan states in some instances.
1. Regional Cooperation: Despite having fewer resources and less international
recognition, regional organizations appear to be more focused in their aspirations to hinder the
spread of terrorism and extremism. Although September 2001 was the turning point in the ‘war
on terror,’ Central Asian states were already working together to counter regional threats of
terror and extremism. One example was the ‘Treaty between the Republic of Kazakhstan, the
Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan Concerning Joint
Action in the Struggle against Terrorism, Political and Religious Extremism, Transnational
Organized Crime, and Other Threats of the Stability and Security of the Parties.’ This treaty
ratified in the Kyrgyz republic in November 2000, shows a Central Asian ambition to counter
terrorism prior to increased U.S. influence and interest in Central Asia. The basic tenets of the
treaty included a mutual condemnation of terrorism and affirmation to extradite criminal
terrorists and extremists. The various parties committed to joint operations and widening the
legal basis of cooperation allowing for more harmony in dealing with terrorism. Article 5 and 6
detail this responsibility.
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Article 4. Joint Measures
1. The Parties will undertake mutually agreed efforts to counteract terrorism, political and
religious extremism, acts aimed at violent change in the constitutional order or the
violation of territorial integrity, transnational organized crime, and the illegal circulation
of narcotics, psychotropic substances and their precursors, arms and ammunition, and
explosives and explosive devices. 2. The Parties will undertake measures to increase the
effectiveness of cooperation between their central competent bodies in the struggle
against the aforementioned phenomena, which threaten the security of the Parties, and
also the life, rights, and lawful interests of their citizens.
Article 5. Broadening of the Legal Basis of Cooperation
The Parties will strive to improve the legal regulation of cooperation within the
framework of the present Treaty and to bring closer the norms of national legislation for
the purpose of counteracting terrorism and other manifestations of extremism and
transnational organized crime. For these purposes the Parties hold consultations on a
regular basis and exchange normative legal acts adopted for the purpose of implementing
the provisions of the present Treaty.8
The importance of this treaty is not solely the regional commitment to combatting
terrorism, extremism and other activities that undermine state security. This treaty shows Central
Asian states taking initiative to cooperate with each other to defeat regional threats. It is no small
feat for states with histories of ethnic conflict and limited enforcement capabilities to firmly
cooperate on increasingly global threats with Russian, Chinese or American leadership.
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Kazakhstan has previously coordinated the tightening of border security with regional partners in
response to terror attacks. This included agreements to send more troops to the border as well as
stricter passage.9 Russia’s Chechen population is also a pressing regional issue. The Russian
battle with Chechen rebels is well documented and one instance in 2002 shows the hesitance of
regional power Kazakhstan in accepting Chechen refugees. Russia forces detonated explosives in
several high-rises, this left many Chechens homeless and seeking refuge in Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan denied this request and the Chechen fighters are cited as the reason by many within
the population.10 This all comes back to the issue of the terrorist and extremist threat and
Kazakhstan’s fear of potentially letting the element into the country.
2. Regional Organizations: Several organizations operate on the regional level that are
dedicated to the maintenance of security within Central Asia and beyond. Many counterterrorist
measures and resolutions are established through such groups. Two groups that come to mind are
the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS). Russia’s influence in both of these organizations is significant and the former
Soviet states work in conjunction with Russia to deal with regional threats. The CSTO is aware
of the threat Afghanistan poses to the region and the members have committed to strengthening
the border Tajikistan shares with Afghanistan.11 Central Asian states know the border with
Afghanistan is a launching point for terror in the region. Russia must also acknowledge that
instability in Central Asia undermines Russian security. Thus, the allocation of funds and
equipment to this border makes sense for all parties and provides a prime example of regional
cooperation. The CIS also promotes counterterror measures and has recently engaged in
exercises in Kyrgyzstan. The Antiterrorist Center (ATC) is an agency of the CIS which
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determines policy to be implemented by CIS states in the field of tackling terrorist threats. The
ATC stays in contact with various proficient national institutions throughout the region, but also
deals with international organizations such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime as
well as the World Forum on Terrorism and Crime.12 Tasked with the responsibility of shaping
the policy of regional players in the context of terrorism and extremism, the ATC serves an
analytical purpose. Analyzing trends, threats and other information about the various states
within and outside of the region as well as coordinating with the national bodies, the ATC
provides a prescription for combatting terror regionally. This branch of the CIS seeks to unify the
response to terror and extremism among the regional players to enhance the effectiveness of said
response.13
3. China and the SCO: Another regional organization is the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO). Established in June 2001 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the SCO was formed with the intent of combatting separatism,
international terrorism and religious extremism. The SCO gave China a stronger voice in Central
Asian affairs. Beijing sees the importance in maintaining close ties with the Central Asian states
and coordinating measures in the fight against terrorism. China feels its own internal security can
be undermined by Central Asian extremists aiding separatist movements in Xinjiang. The SCO
continued to grow. Just under a year later, the member states of the SCO sanctioned the creation
of an anti-terrorism structure that would eventually be established in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. This
was followed by a joint exercise between the commander of the Xinjiang region and Kyrgyz
forces which marked the first time in several decades that China engaged in a joint military
exercise with a foreign country.14 In 2003, the SCO held a joint anti-terrorist exercise with over
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1000 soldiers from all of the member countries. The exercises held in Kazakhstan and the
Xinjiang region marked a significant point in the SCO’s development. The Sino-Russian ‘Peace
Mission 2005’ was another exercise with approximately 10,000 troops.15 These exercises point to
the development of the SCO as a regional force and further entrench regional commitment to
countering terrorist and extremist activity.
C. The status of the State and the Individual in the fight against terror
Many of the levels of analysis used in this chapter overlap. They do not exist independent
of each other and one can find linkages between all levels of analysis. With that said I chose to
analyze the role of the state in the context of terror and how that affects the individual. The
reasoning behind this decision is the potential ramifications of state indiscretion in dealing with
domestic terror.
1. Threat within the state: It is important to note the presence of extremist and terrorist
groups within Kazakhstan. Hizb ut Tahrir has been operating openly within the country and
small pockets of IMU members are also present. The emergence of a new group known as Jund
al Khilafah has intensified the need for a strong state to combat terrorism and extremism. This is
especially true considering Jund al Khilafah took credit for the last two terror attacks that rocked
the relatively quiet country.16 There have been several other attempts that were foiled by law
enforcement. The Kazakh government is dedicated to stopping terrorist groups, but one
distinction must be made. Treatment of terrorist groups and extremist groups should not be
uniform. A group like Hizb ut Tahrir should not be dealt with in the same manner as the militants
in the IMU or Jund al Khilafah. I argue it is important to refrain from hastily grouping all of
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these organizations together and a brief look into the individual level of analysis should shed
some light on this assertion.
2. State contributing to radicalization: Kazakhstan’s ascendance into the leading power in
the region in the war on terror makes the country responsible for setting an example on how to
deal with domestic terror. This role seems to characterize the country’s crackdown on Islamist
groups. The IMU and Jund al-Khilafah are militant Islamist groups whom engage in terrorist
activity and seek to reach their ambitions through violent means. HT on the other hand is an
extremist group with radical views, but has not been found to have ties with violence nor the
funding of terror. Even global powers acknowledge there are no discernible links between HT
and terror, with the U.S. and U.K. refusing to label the group as a terrorist organization.17 This is
where a dilemma arises, Kazakhstan’s crackdown on Islamic groups can have a radicalizing
effect. Former militant and current author, Ahmed Rashid warns of the potential for violence by
those being repressed by Central Asian governments. Rashid proceeded to speak about the
possibility of HT support the IMU in the Fergana valley militarily.18 The Kazakh government
must not simply repress civilians for holding extremist views. At the very least some
differentiation between terrorist groups and extremists must be made. Repressing an individual
for passing out anti-government propaganda is an effective way of hindering the circulation of
leaflets, but does not stop the message and in some cases reinforces it. Finding a solution to this
predicament is not a simple task and perhaps renewed efforts of placating these groups may be
necessary, but it is imperative that the non-violent propagandist is not treated in the same manner
as the violent militant.
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III. Analyzing narcotics and arms trafficking
The issue of narcotics and arms trafficking is closely linked to terrorism. Global and
regional responses to trafficking often overlap. Matters become more complicated when
analyzing the state and individual. The lucrative drug trade is often too enticing and causes
institutional incompetence and acts of corruption.
A. Global response to trafficking
Both narcotics and weapons trafficking are increasingly pertinent global issues with ties
to various other international and domestic challenges. Governments are well aware of the rising
trend of trafficking. Trafficking is tied to the growth of terrorism, corruption and undermines
state stability.
1. Global response to trafficking as a part of the larger ‘war on terror’: At this point, we
are aware of the financial impact of narcotics trafficking and how it funds terrorist groups. The
United States have supported Kazakhstan’s efforts in protecting their borders through the EXBS
program. Many of the methods of combatting terrorism also includes anti-narcotic measures
because the ‘war on terror’ has becoming inextricably tied to trafficking of narcotics in
particular. The term “narco-terrorism” is commonly utilized to describe the interplay between
narcotics trafficking and terrorism. Before September 11th, the United States’ contribution to
stopping trafficking in Central Asia left much to be desired. Tajikistan is arguably the most
significant Central Asian state in terms of trafficking. The shared border with Afghanistan points
to a need to reinforce the Tajik government with supplies and funds to hinder the spread of
narcotics and loose weapons throughout the region. The head of Tajikistan’s Drug Control
Agency, General Rustam Nazarov, approached the United States in hopes of securing aid from
the American Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Nazarov failed to receive the aid he sought and
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criticized the American response to Central Asian issues prior to September 11th. Following the
attack on American soil, the U.S. State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs provided the region with financial and military support to stem the growth
of trafficking. The U.N. also provided financial support, while the UN Office of Drug Control
and Crime Prevention (UNDCCP) pays its officer’s high wages relative to the pay of other
regional officers.19 Higher wages are in place to dissuade officers from being a party to illicit
trafficking. In this case we must analyze the individual to find out whether this motivation is
actually effective or if it simply masks more widespread corruption.
B. State impacting the individual or individuals impacting the state?
The main reason I assess the state and the individual together in the context of trafficking
is corruption. Individuals are incentivized to better their financial situation and do so by
engaging in acts of corruption. A culture of corruption exists that contributes to individual
instances of corruption. This creates a cycle of corruption which plagues many regional
institutions and hinders the fight against narcotics and arms trafficking.
1. How individuals and the state are impacted by trafficking: I previously mentioned the
negative effects drugs and weapons trafficking have on the individual and the state. The rise in
cases of HIV are overwhelmingly tied to heroin usage.20 Crime is another consequence of
trafficking as dealers and buyers engage in theft, violence and domestic abuse amongst other
delinquencies.21 The culmination of these issues presents problems for the state which undermine
public safety as well as economic production.
2. Corruption in the state and individual: One of the prominent challenges that hinder the
effective execution of counternarcotic operations is corruption. Several individuals within the
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region are guilty of some form of corruption. The individual motivation for corruption is
obvious. Massive revenues from narcotics trafficking tempt many into illicit behavior in order to
support themselves financially. On several occasions, bribes have been paid in order for one to
gain employment in a position of authority. This points to an institutional level of corruption.
Several individuals seeing the potential benefit in abusing their positions contributes to an
overall culture of corruption within state agencies. The impact of international aid is diminished
as corrupt institutions do just enough to maintain acceptable numbers of seizures and arrests,
while still benefitting from illicit behavior. The funds can further entrench their positions within
the government or aid in promotion.22 With much of the region’s institutions suffering from
internal corruption it is imperative for international agencies and funders to carefully scrutinize
the agencies they support. The issue of poverty is a compelling motivator in corruption even
when authorities are paid relatively higher wages. Most Central Asian states cannot compete
with revenues of trafficking and thus fail to dissuade many individuals from accepting bribes or
extorting traffickers and civilians. State officials also benefit from illicit wages and state
institutions will continue to be hobbled by inefficiency if a solution is not found.
C. Regional commitment to stopping trafficking
Regional reaction to narcotics and arms trafficking is similar to their response to terror.
There are a few differences however. The permeation of corruption within regional institutions is
much more present in the case of trafficking than in terror. Regional players are much less likely
to allow terrorist organizations to operate freely and that is why groups such as the IMU were
previously run out of Central Asia and into Afghanistan. The monetary benefit in allowing
terrorist activity to thrive is nowhere near as tempting as profiting off the drug trade. With that
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said, the perspectives of regional organizations such as the CSTO and CIS are largely the same
as their views of battling terrorism. Training exercises are needed to battle terrorist groups and
exercises are needed to counter trafficking as well. Once again the link between terror and
trafficking comes to light. As long as drugs are trafficked from Afghanistan through the region
Central Asia is under threat of destabilization.23 Again the CSTO and CIS are involved in efforts
to increase Central Asia stability and once again this can be tied to Russia seeking to maintain its
own stability.
The threat of trafficking is closely linked to the threat of terrorism and this allows for
regional and international harmonization in combatting both. Many exercises that aim to counter
the flow of narcotics ultimately seek to dissipate terrorist influence. Regional organizations have
played a prominent role in enacting these exercises and the states of Central Asia tackle both
threats in conjunction. U.S. military and U.N. financial aid also allow for a more effective
defense against trafficking, but institutional corruption often times hinders these efforts.
Corruption and the perpetuation of illicit trafficking are linked in the same manner that terrorism
and trafficking are. Corruption must be confronted in order to efficiently curb trafficking. This
task is easier said than done due to the massive revenues generated by trafficking. Decreasing the
demand of illegal substances can be a potential solution to decreasing the influence trafficking
has on terror and institutional corruption. I believe there will still be an overwhelming demand
for narcotics even with governmental efforts to reduce usage by the population.
IV. Analyzing Border Challenges
There are several other challenges that are present in Central Asia aside from trafficking
and terrorism. Ethnic tensions, demarcation and illegal migration are few of the border
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challenges Central Asian states continue to face. Kazakhstan’s energy resources also provide an
interesting scenario in which various international and regional powers seek to influence the
allocation of said resources.
A. Regional and State perspectives
Ethnic tensions, demarcation and illegal migration are not problems limited to the Central
Asia, yet the solutions and consequences of these challenges occur largely within a regional
context. State responses to these issues either impact the region or are guided by accepted
regional norms.
1. Ethnic tensions: Without reiterating the content of the previous chapter, one should
understand the role ethnic tension and conflict play on a regional and domestic scale. The
conflict in the Fergana valley places Tajiks, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in close vicinity. The conflict
between Uzbek separatists and Kyrgyz in 2010 is one with domestic and regional implications.
The Kyrgyz state must combat separatists that seek to stoke ethnic vehemence while not inciting
those passions themselves. The density of the population in Fergana and the proximity of ethnic
groups does not make this an easy task and states must walk the fine line between dealing with
separatist movements without endangering their internal security or adding fire to the current
ethnic tension. Severe crackdowns on Uzbek separatists could intensify ethnic conflict which in
turn undermines regional stability. There is a trace of regional discord with the treatment of the
Uighur population. China is concerned about separatism and terrorism among the Uighur
population. Kazakhstan on the other hand has had little trouble with their Uighur population.
Uighurs in Kazakhstan play an important role in Kazakh society and many of the Chinese
concerns appear to be about domestic homogeneity. Uighur adherence to Islam is incongruent
114

with the overwhelming majority of Chinese society. Islam is the prominent religion in Central
Asia and the Uighur population does not pose a threat to the regional security.
2. Demarcation: Demarcation was a prominent issue following Soviet dissolution and up
until the mid-2000s. Although demarcation efforts are still ongoing as is the case of the RussianKazakh border, the majority of issues have been resolved. In large demarcation has attributed to
domestic and regional cooperation. Central Asian states in agreement with China and Russia
worked to limit military operations from border areas in 1996.24 This agreement paved the way
for increased regional cooperation through organizations like the SCO, CIS and CSTO. Increased
regional integration guided some domestic policy and the role of the ATC provides a prime
example. Kazakhstan’s increased integration with China also points to regional influence in the
demarcation process on domestic affairs.
3. Migration: The growth of illegal migration is another regional phenomenon. Further
examination shows the main reasons behind migration is the pursuit of employment and financial
security. Just like in the case of corruption, the individual is motivated by financial factors.
People seek these opportunities in order to provide for their families. Migration of this kind
points to multiple realities. It elucidates the lack of financial opportunities in other states, most
specifically the southern portion of Central Asia. The job market and social safety net of these
countries are not extensive enough to provide for a significant segment of the population. For
this reason many Central Asians travel from their countries in search of work. The final
destination for these migrant workers is generally Russia, the EU or Kazakhstan.25 Kazakhstan’s
financial strength in relation to other states in Central Asia is the next point in my argument.
Laborers choosing to migrate from other states to work in Kazakhstan underlines the country’s
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financial success domestically. Close economic ties with the Russia, China and the U.S. are
major contributing factors to Kazakh affluence with natural resources being a fundamental
element of these partnerships.
B. International and Regional competition for resources
The resource wealth of Kazakhstan has intrigued the EU, Israel, China, Russia and the
United States to name a few. Previous examination shows the consequences of the various
negotiations and inquiries into Kazakh resource production and export. While Russia and China
have been the overwhelming victors in the race for Kazakh pipelines, it is important to analyze
regional, international and domestic consequences.
1. Iran, the U.S. and domestic success: Kazakhstan gained domestically with the aid of
the U.S. and at the expense of Iran. With an endowment of U.S. military and financial support
the Kazakh border agencies and customs patrols were more effective in their protection of their
region of the Caspian. This counteracted the threat of Iran. This is important because Iran strived
to divide the Caspian Sea along lines established in treaties in the 1920s and 1940s.26 Kazakhstan
managed to maintain its large holdings of oil which provided a foundation for the state’s
economic success. The U.S. aided in the protection of Kazakh resources and provided a
foundation for Kazakh self-defense in the Caspian from powers like Iran.
2. China and Russia gain: Chinese and Russian negotiations with Kazakhstan have
benefitted all parties. Kazakhstan has recently established oil pipelines with China and gas
pipelines with Russia. The oil pipeline with China has made the Chinese less reliant on oil from
the turbulent Middle East.27 While Russia has been able to create a resource monopoly of sorts in
Central Asia. Russia needed to establish gas pipelines with Caspian states to ensure their supply
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to the European Union.28 Kazakhstan gains financially and underlines the relationships with
Russia and China that were forged in counterterror, counter-trafficking and demarcation efforts.
V. Conclusion
The challenges of Kazakhstan and Central Asia as a whole are multifaceted and can be
examined in various ways. Choosing to analyze the global, regional, state and individual
perspectives allowed for a fuller explanation of the present challenges. We were able to see the
difference in responses on the multiple levels and how it is important to differentiate between
them. It is also important to make notice of the overlap in the differing areas of analysis.
Regional policy can influence state policy and vice versa. The actions of several individuals can
have a global impact and ignite a war where the enemy is a non-state actor. The complicated
nature of the region further emphasized the strategic importance of Kazakhstan. With multiple
ties already established with global powers Kazakhstan must continue to be supported as a
stabilizing force and economic example for the rest of Central Asia.
All of the preceding challenges can be alleviated with the continuation and intensification
in regional commitment to border management. This involves state to state cooperation as seen
in the ties between Kazakhstan and China; as well as regional coordination as seen in the actions
of the CIS in combatting issues like terror and trafficking. Institutional reform will also be an
important solution to regional problems of corruption. Border agencies should continue to be
equipped with sufficient tools to detect the transfer of arms and narcotics. At the same time,
governments must challenge the financial incentive provided by traffickers and at times
extremists. This will be one of the more difficult areas in the effort to strengthen border security.
Regional and international pressure will be necessary to reduce the impact of the culture of
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corruption that exists in the region. Human rights is another important facet of border
management. The protection of human rights will diminish the effectiveness of a significant
segment of extremist propaganda. Government abuses become fodder for anti-government
propaganda, especially when the majority of those repressed by the government are of a
particular group.
There are numerous challenges to Central Asian border security. These issues will likely
never be completely resolved, but the threat of extremist groups, trafficking and corruption can
be reduced. The collaborative effort of regional states with international organizations and other
global powers is pivotal and points to the importance of the region.
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A1: Nairobi Embassy bombing

Thomas Coex /AFP - Getty Images Nbc News http://www.nbcnews.com/id/40241632/#.Umgpd_mThYg
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A2: Dagestan Attack

AFP. BBC News http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20593383
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A3: Abasatter Derbisali: Former Supreme Mufti of Kazakhstan

Berkley Center. “Abasatter Derbisali” http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/resources/people/abasatter-derbisali
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A4: Uzbek Militants arrested in Pakistan

Mahmood, Tariq, AFP/Getty Images
http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/main/2010/07/27/feature-02
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A5: Truck checked for drugs on Russian-Kazakh border

Alexandra Babkina, Central Asia Online.
http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/main/2012/08/01/feature-01
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A6: Kazakh border agents on southern border

Alexandra Babkina, Central Asia Online.
http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/main/2012/08/01/feature-01
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A7: Uighurs in China

Gilles Sabrie, The New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/08/world/asia/uighurs-in-china-say-bias-isgrowing.html
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A8: Caspian Oil rig

Konul Khalilova, BBC News. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10132781
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B1: Population Density in Fergana Valley

Novikov, Viktor and Rekacewicz, Philippe. “Population distribution in the Ferghana Valley.” UNEP/GRIDARENDAL http://www1.american.edu/ted/ICE/ferghana.html

130

B2: The Geography of Transnational Terror attacks

World Robinson, “The Geography of Terrorism: Global Patterns of Attack, 2001-2011
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/242/html

131

B3: Geography of Domestic Terror Attack

World Robinson, “Domestic Attacks” http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/242/html
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B4: Ethnicity Map of Central Asia

Perry, Castaneda, “Major Ethnic Groups in Central Asia” The Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/kazakhstan.html
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B5: Map Kazakhstan’s Southern Border, note the proximity of Almaty to Kyrgyzstan and
Shymkent to Uzbekistan

Perry, Castaneda, “Kazakhstan (Small Map)” The Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/cia13/kazakhstan_sm_2013.gif
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B6: Drug-Trafficking Routes from Northern Afghanistan

Federation of American Scientists (FAS), “Drug-Trafficking Route from Northern Afghanistan”
https://www.neweurasia.net/politics-and-society/is-the-dentist-dictator-drilling-a-hole-into-the-drug-cavity/
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B7: Drug routes from Afghanistan

United Nations Department of Crime (UNDOC) https://www.neweurasia.net/politics-and-society/is-the-dentistdictator-drilling-a-hole-into-the-drug-cavity/
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B8: Opium and Heroin transport channels through Central Asia

The Wall Street Journal, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/data/upimages/drug_trade_route_through_tajikistan.jpg
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B9: Probable Europe-bound opiates trafficking

UNODC, Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, Michel Koutouzis, Alain Labrouse, “Probable Europe-bound opiates trafficking”
http://geopium.org/196/the-drug-routes-from-central-asia-to-europe

138

B10: Oil and gas riches of the Caspian

Petroleum Economist, BBC News “Oil and gas riches in the Caspian” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10132781
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B11: Central Asia’s border with China

“RussiaChina” CNN http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9704/23/russia.china/
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B12: Regional Oil Pipelines

EIA Oil Map http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/China/images/oil_map.png
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B13: Caspian Oil Holdings

The Dossier Caspian Sea Oil Reserves http://www.thedossier.info/maps_charts/caspian-sea-oil-reserves.jpg
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Graphs & Charts
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C1: Perception of Corruption

Guadalupe, Patricia, “Percentage saying level of Corruption in their country is higher now than during the Soviet
Union days.” Photograph Gallup, http://media.gallup.com/POLL/Releases/pr071010bi.gif
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C2: Support for establishing Sharia

Fisher, Max, “Support for Sharia.” The Washington Post.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/05/02/what-the-muslim-world-believes-on-everythingfrom-alcohol-to-honor-killings-in-8-maps-and-4-charts/
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C3: Heroin seizures in Central Asia, by country, 2009-2010

UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia Drug Situation Report 2011, “Heroin seizures in Central Asia, by
country, 2009-2010” http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/corru/doc/drug2.html
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C4: Blossoming Trade and Heroin Seizures

United Nations on Office on Drugs and Crime “Blossoming Trade”
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113754320927949073.html
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C5: Caspian Sea region gross natural gas production (2000-12)

U.S. Energy Information Administration, IHS EDIN, Eastern Bloc Energy, Rigzone, and Rystad Energy, “Caspian
Sea region gross natural gas production (2000-12)” http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=12911
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C6: Caspian Sea region oil production (2000-12)

U.S. Energy Information Administration, IHS EDIN, Eastern Bloc Energy, Rigzone, and Rystad Energy, “Caspian
Sea region oil production (2000-12)” http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=12911
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C7: Estimates of Recoverable Oil and Gas Resources in the Caspian Region

U.S. Department of State, Caspian Region Energy Development Report, Estimates of Recoverable Oil and Gas
Resources in the Caspian Region. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1997/07/bg1132
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C8: China’s Oil Imports per day 2011

EIA Top Ten net oil importers, 2011
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/China/images/top_ten_oil_importers.png
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C9: Multi-level analysis of threats to security
Issues
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Terror

Global Response to
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State crackdown on
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groups. Potential
radicalizing effect of
state suppression

U.S. president setting
tone of war on terror,
caution and then
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world leaders

Trafficking

Global view of
trafficking as
fundamental part of
terror. Europe as
significant consumer
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trafficking,
Afghanistan drugs
through Tajikistan
and onto Central Asia
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Demarcation
and
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Iran
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causing instability
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(i.e. Kazakhstan &
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success
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following
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